

***POLICY ISSUES
AND PLANNING RESPONSES***



Notes

***CENTRE FOR HUMAN SETTLEMENTS
SCHOOL OF COMMUNITY AND
REGIONAL PLANNING***

University of British Columbia

**HALLMARK EVENTS, EVICTIONS
AND HOUSING RIGHTS:
*The Canadian Case***

Kris Olds
November 1996

P1 10

**Centre for Human Settlements
School of Community and Regional Planning
The University of British Columbia
Vancouver, Canada**

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This study would not have been possible without the generous assistance of many people. I would particularly like to thank Michael Beazley, Peter Boothroyd, Jan Borowy, Calvin Brook, Jim Green, Paul Henderson, David Hulchanski, Aprodocio Laquian, Michael Leaf, David Ley, Michael Melling, Colin Michael Hall, Michael Shapcott, John Shayler, Laura Stannard, and Mary-Kate Tews. Thanks also to Enrique Ortiz of HIC, and Denise Deby and Patricia McCarney of IDRC.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.	INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW	1
1.1	Research Questions	1
1.2	Research Methods	2
1.3	Background: Hallmark Events and Forced Evictions	2
1.4	Overview of Research Findings in the Three Case Studies	3
	 THE CASE STUDIES	
2.	VANCOUVER—EXPO '86.....	6
2.1	The Vancouver Context	6
2.2	Expo '86	7
2.3	Evictions, Displacement and Community Action in Vancouver	8
2.3.1	Housing Rights and the Legal Framework in Vancouver	8
2.3.2	Expo '86's Next Door Neighbour: The Downtown Eastside	9
2.3.3	The Expo '86 Eviction Saga	11
2.3.4	The Social Impacts of Expo '86	15
2.4	Community Action and Impact: The Critical Factors	20
3.	CALGARY—THE 1988 WINTER OLYMPICS	22
3.1	The Calgary Context	22
3.2	The 1988 Calgary Winter Olympics	23
3.3	Evictions, Displacement and Community Action in Calgary	25
3.3.1	Housing Rights and the Legal Framework in Calgary, Alberta	25
3.3.2	Victoria Park and the Saddledome Impacts	26
3.3.3	Evictions from Rental Apartments	29
3.3.4	Evictions from a Residential Hotel	33
3.3.5	Evictions from Student Residences	35
3.4	Community Action and Impact: The Critical Factors	36
4.	TORONTO: THE BID FOR THE 1996 SUMMER OLYMPICS	38
4.1	The Toronto Context	38
4.2	The Toronto Bid for the 1996 Summer Olympics	39
4.3	Olympic Housing Concerns and Community Action in Toronto	41
4.3.1	Housing Rights and the Legal Framework in Toronto, Ontario	41
4.3.2	The Incorporation of Housing and Eviction Concerns into the Bid Process	41
4.4	Community Action and Impact: The Critical Factors	47
5.	CONCLUSIONS	49
5.1	Housing Rights in the Face of the Hallmark Event?	49
5.2	Interpretation	50

APPENDIX A	52
APPENDIX B	
RESOURCE PEOPLE	55
BIBLIOGRAPHY	58

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Map of the Vancouver Downtown Eastside	10
Figure 2 Photograph of a Vancouver Residential Hotel.....	13
Figure 3 Photograph of a Public Debate Over Expo '86 Evictions.....	13
Figure 4 Poster Advertising Community Rally.....	16
Figure 5 Chart Indicating Land Values	17
Figure 6 Map of Alberta	22
Figure 7 Photograph of Olympic "Gateway" in Calgary	28
Figure 8 Photograph of Rocky Mountain Court.....	31
Figure 9 Cover of "Bread Not Circuses" Report.....	47

HALLMARK EVENTS, EVICTIONS AND HOUSING RIGHTS:

The Canadian Case

1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

This paper examines hallmark event-related evictions, community action and housing rights in three Canadian cases—Expo '86 in Vancouver, the 1988 Calgary Winter Olympics, and the rejected proposal for the 1996 Summer Olympic Games in Toronto. The study takes into account the common frame of reference for research and dissemination of information on evictions and the right to housing used in the other sections of this paper.

While the study is focused on housing issues, an effort is made to set the discussion of housing impacts in a broader economic, cultural and political context. However, because of space limitations, many important issues related to these events, their impacts, and community action simply could not be addressed.

1.1 Research Questions

The aim of this project is to contribute to the knowledge of the concrete conditions and obstacles that lead to the true applicability of the right to housing as part of a more comprehensive right: the right to the city. To do so, a variety of research questions are developed and these fall under four broad categories:

- 1) *Actors and Motives.* Who were the actors in the eviction issue? What were the interests and motivations of the various actors in the eviction process? How did the various actors relate to each other? What actions were undertaken by the governments and the sponsors of the hallmark event to prevent evictions from occurring?
- 2) *Forms of Social Resistance.* What different actions were undertaken to prevent evictions from occurring? What were the reasons for the success and/or failure of the actions?
- 3) *Institutional Context.* What is the legal and jurisdictional context of the eviction process? What housing "rights" do landlords, tenants, governments and hallmark event sponsors have with respect to the eviction issue? What types of alternatives did the community have open to them to prevent the evictions, and were they used? What discourse took place on the issue of "housing rights"?

- 4) *Effects of Evictions.* At the micro-level, how many people were evicted? What were the housing conditions of the impacted people before, during and after the eviction? What were the health effects of the eviction process? What impact did the evictions have on existing social networks in the community? Were there any gender-specific issues with respect to eviction effects? At the macro-level, what is the impact of the hallmark event on housing stock in the community? What is the role of the hallmark event in redeveloping urban space? What are, or could be, some of the long-term implications of such redevelopment for tenants?

These research questions are similar to those asked in the other country studies, but differ to a degree in that they also reflect the peculiarities of the Canadian context.

1.2 Research Methods

A case study approach of a qualitative nature is employed in this research project. A wide variety of research techniques are employed within the case study methodology to both acquire and analyze data in an effort to address all of the research questions outlined above. Both primary and secondary sources of data are used to address these research questions. Focused interviews and semi-structured interviews with representatives of community groups, non-governmental organizations, government officials, government politicians, hallmark event sponsors and the media were conducted. Reports, academic articles, student theses, and the various mediums of media are analyzed as well.

Field work was carried out for one week in both Calgary and Toronto in 1991. We interviewed 10 to 15 people in each of the three cities regarding the various research questions. The Vancouver case is an update of previous research conducted by the author (Olds, 1988), while the Calgary and Toronto cases are original research.

Due to the nature of the research questions, the analysis is primarily of a qualitative nature and it tells a story from an informed perspective. Some quantitative data is drawn upon to illustrate specific points.

1.3 Background: Hallmark Events and Forced Evictions

Tourism is emerging as one of the major industries in the world. One high profile component of tourism is the hallmark event. Hallmark events are defined by Ritchie (1984, p. 2) as:

Major one-time or recurring events of limited duration, developed primarily to enhance the awareness, appeal and profitability of a tourism destination in the short and/or long term. Such events rely for their success on uniqueness, status, or timely significance to create interest and attract attention.

World Fairs and the Olympics are the two largest forms of hallmark events.

Forced evictions and the subsequent negative impacts upon evictees is a phenomenon rarely associated with the western, industrialized, "first world." In recent decades however, it has become increasingly common to hear of large-scale forced evictions associated with the sponsorship of hallmark events such as a World Fair, or Olympics. As such events are by their very nature "unique," and "once-in-a-lifetime," communities in host cities are often unaware or lacking in knowledge of how to prepare for and prevent such evictions from occurring. Following the event, longer term displacement impacts often occur. In the majority of cases, these events have been used to initiate and propel urban redevelopment plans. Long-term redevelopment planning is occurring with the hallmark event acting as a catalyst, and communities—usually made up of the urban poor—paying the costs in terms of displacement, negative health effects, the breaking of social networks, and the loss of affordable housing (Olds, 1988; Hall, 1992).

Little research has been carried out on the issue of hallmark event-related evictions and none of a comparative (regional or international) nature. Olds (1988) examined the changing nature of the World's Fair since the late 1800s. In the last two decades, the hallmark events' use as an inner-city redevelopment planning tool, in combination with the pressures created by millions of fair visitors, has tended to create four main forms of housing impacts: 1) on-site impact; 2) post-announcement speculative impact; 3) pre-event tourist accommodation supply impact; and 4) post-event impact. In cities as diverse as San Antonio, Seattle, Montreal, Spokane, Knoxville, New Orleans, and Brisbane, hundreds to thousands of tenants have been evicted because of event-induced pressures. For example, between 1000 and 1500 people were evicted in Knoxville, Tennessee because of redevelopment pressures associated with Expo '82. Consequently, the Korean and Canadian cases in this book represent a first step towards the detailed examination of the social impacts of hallmark events; impacts which clearly contravene the human right to housing.

1.4 Overview of Research Findings in the Three Case Studies

Forced evictions related to the sponsorship of hallmark events took place in both Vancouver and Calgary, while the potential for evictions became an important issue in deliberations over the Olympic

bid proposal in Toronto. In each case, the nature of the issue was structured by specific contextual elements (e.g., the nature of the political regimes in power; local housing markets), and by more generic forces related to the specifics of both bidding for and operating a hallmark event.

In Vancouver, while no housing was demolished on the Expo '86 site, post-announcement speculative impacts were created in the inner-city Downtown Eastside neighbourhood which bordered the fair site. Land values increased after the announcement and between 1000 and 2000 lodging house units were demolished or closed down. This loss occurred between 1978 and 1984 (Expo '86 was announced in 1980) with another 600 units permanently lost between 1984 and 1986. Expo '86 was only one of several contributing factors to this loss, however. Pre-Expo tourist accommodation supply impact began occurring vigorously three to four months before the May 2, 1986 Expo '86 opening. By July 1986, the impacts ceased leaving a total of 500-850 residents dislocated. Many of the poor, elderly, primarily male evictees faced serious health problems, and several committed suicide, or died prematurely. Following the closure of Expo '86, Downtown Eastside vacancy rates returned to pre-fair levels and the vast majority of evicting residential hotels began catering to traditional clientele. Some hotels owners faced serious financial difficulties though, because reality did not meet their expectations with respect to tourist demand. The Downtown Eastside housing and land market has remained unstable since 1986. The future development plans for the Expo site and other downtown areas are beginning to create pressures on existing residents and these can be expected to continue over the next twenty year development phase (Hulchanski, 1989).

Although community action, based upon the right to housing, was vigorous and strategic in the Vancouver case, it had little ameliorative impact. This was because of the "politics of planning;" the issues of political jurisdiction, ideology and ideological differences. The Provincial Government alone could pass rent and eviction control legislation. Analysis of comments by provincial politicians and their supporters suggests an ideology that values the exchange-value of housing over the use-value; a belief in the primacy of economic relations; a belief that the inner city must be redeveloped; and, a belief that Downtown Eastside residents do not live in a "community" but rather in a geographic area without bonds to the physical or social environment, and obviously, without the right to housing. Long-term housing impacts continue to be addressed by the community, with only partial support from the government. Unfortunately, in the long run, the residential displacement process will be more damaging to the community than the Expo '86 eviction saga. While the community is active, they are engaged in an exhausting struggle in a long-term process that receives little supportive attention from policy makers.

The 1988 *Calgary* Winter Olympics caused or contributed to *four* forms of housing impacts. *First*, in the construction phase of the Games, a stadium was sited in a recreational area bordering one of

Calgary's poorest residential communities, Victoria Park. The stadium was sited in this area against most of the community's wishes in a process which involved autocratic decision making. This decision contributed to the ongoing destabilization of the community in order to satiate future expansion plans for the recreational area that included the Calgary Stampede and Exhibition grounds. *Second*, approximately 740 tenants were displaced from two apartment building complexes in Calgary. The tenants were offered moving assistance and financial incentives to move, although it should be noted they had no legal choice as the Alberta *Landlord and Tenant Act* (1988) permits eviction without cause. *Third*, several dozen long-term residential hotel dwellers were relocated from their rooms in a downtown hotel (with incentives again) in order to make room for Olympic visitors. And *fourth*, approximately 1,450 students were temporarily displaced from residences at two Calgary educational institutions. Again, assistance and prior notice was offered to the students to help them with their move, though they had no choice but to move.

Community resistance was ineffective in Victoria Park, and failed to develop in any significant manner in the other cases. This was because of lack of access to, and support from, powerful local and provincial politicians, and Olympic organizers (groups with interlocking networks) who have long-term plans for the community's land. Moreover, provincial laws governing landlord and tenant relations enabled such displacement to take place, effectively annulling the reasoning behind the tenants' protests. This situation both reflects and contributes to the perception of tenants in Alberta as "second class citizens."

Toronto failed to win the bid for the 1996 Summer Olympics. However, housing issues, including the potential for eviction, were incorporated into the bid process, and a plan to address such concerns was developed by the City, and agreed to by the Provincial Government. The main reasons for this relatively progressive situation include; 1) active and strategic community work on the issues; 2) important support for community concerns from some political and bureaucratic actors; and 3) contextual factors including an ongoing housing crisis which made various actors aware of the need to address housing concerns, and historically strong tenancy laws (relative to Vancouver and Calgary) which effectively forced all debates to be based upon an assumption that evictions should be categorically abhorred. However, numerous weaknesses in the landlord and tenant laws were identified by community activists in the bid preparation process, demonstrating that even with rhetoric, and law, the political commitment must exist to implement the right to housing.

THE CASE STUDIES

2. VANCOUVER—EXPO '86

2.1 The Vancouver Context

Vancouver is Canada's third largest city, with a 1991 population of approximately 460,000, and a regional population of 1.4 million. Located on the west coast of North America, the city has been the western terminus of the cross-Canada railway since the turn of the twentieth century. Vancouver has grown rapidly since this time, acting as a service centre for B.C.'s growing resource economy (primarily logging, mining, and fishing) in the first seven decades of the 1900s. The city has a relatively small (compared to a city like Toronto) manufacturing base which is gradually shifting to the suburbs.

From the 1970s on, Vancouver's tourism industry grew at a rapid pace, and Expo '86 can be seen to both symbolize and contribute to this growth. Overall, the city is generally perceived to have made a "successful" transition from industrial to post-industrial status (Ley, 1980). Vancouver has become a centre for higher order producer services (e.g., accounting, engineering) for not only the province, but also for much of western Canada, and increasingly the Pacific Rim (Davis and Hutton, 1992). Such structural change is contributing to the ongoing transformation of industrial land in the centre of the city, towards residential and commercial uses, and this has increased land values in the inner city, the locale for much of Vancouver's low cost housing stock. In 1986, Vancouver was the second most expensive city in Canada to live in (after Toronto), and by 1992, it overtook Toronto in terms of overall living expense.

Expo '86 came into being during a major recession in British Columbia and Vancouver, as resource industries were being ravaged by global restructuring processes, and while a highly contentious "restraint" programme was being developed and implemented by a neo-conservative provincial government. Expo was designed to be a "feel good" spectacle to help people forget the conflict and economic hardships being felt in the 1980s, while also creating jobs (construction and tourism), and demonstrating to the world potential investment "opportunities" in various sectors of the economy, including real estate. As noted in *The Expo '86 General Report* "[I]t was imperative that this exposition transcend the reality of a troubled decade" (Government of Canada, 1986, p. 75).

2.2 Expo '86

While the first documented proposal for holding a World's Fair in Vancouver's inner city was in 1974, it was not until February 1978 that the idea of sponsoring a fair was seriously raised again. Architect Randle Iredale prepared a "concept study" for the redevelopment of the north shore of False Creek. This land is on the opposite side of False Creek from the celebrated False Creek Neighbourhood being developed at that time. The north side of False Creek had been under consideration for redevelopment since 1967 when Marathon Realty (the real estate arm of Canadian Pacific Railway) first raised the issue of building residential towers on the declining industrial site.

After reading the Iredale "concept study," the sponsor of the study, the Provincial Recreation and Conservation Minister proposed an "international exposition to complement Vancouver's 1986 centenary." Vancouver's centenary was simply a suitable excuse to hold a World's Fair given that all fairs are linked to "important" dates such as the centennial of the French Revolution (Expo 1889), the 400th anniversary of the arrival of Columbus in America (Expo 1893) or the tenth anniversary of the gold rush (Expo 1909). This linkage is required in order to attract support from the community, all levels of government and the Bureau of International Expositions (BIE).

In January 1980, Premier William Bennett announced his "vision for the future, a vision to build a great meeting place for all our people that we would call British Columbia Place." His vision consisted of a sports stadium, a World's Fair, and a brand new rapid transit line linking the central business district to the site and the suburbs. He mentioned the enormity of the site and the consequent benefits for all people of Vancouver if it was developed properly. Most important of all, from the perspective of this article, was the use of a fair to kick-off the redevelopment project:

the trigger for this development will be Transpo '86 ... We see in this Exposition an opportunity to host both a major World Fair and to proceed with developments that suit our present and future needs ... we see in Transpo '86 the chance for a celebration that will leave a lasting legacy. (Bennett, 1980).

Soon after, the Expo '86 Corporation was officially established. It was a crown corporation with an appointed board responsible to the Province. Unfortunately, as we shall see, the fair and its seventy hectare site was situated next to one of Vancouver's poorest communities—the Downtown Eastside.

2.3 Evictions, Displacement and Community Action in Vancouver

2.3.1 Housing Rights and the Legal Framework in Vancouver, British Columbia

The housing rights (or lack thereof) of residential hotel dwellers (the vast majority of Expo '86 evictees) in British Columbia in 1986 are a critical factor to understanding the nature and scale of Expo-related evictions in Vancouver.

In B.C., landlord-tenant relations are governed by the provincial *Residential Tenancy Act (RTA)*. Local government does *not* have the legal authority to create regulations affecting key relationships between landlord and tenant such as the setting of rent levels or security of tenure. The provincial RTA stipulates the various rights and obligations of both landlord and tenant, including concerns such as rent increases, subletting, etc. For example, evictions can only take place for specific reasons for example damage to the suite, although rent increases (permitted once per year, with no limits on the scale) can effectively force a tenant out. The RTA does offer some degree of security, albeit an uncertain one.

Unfortunately, in 1986, residential hotel dwellers were not even protected by the RTA, as they were classified as "licensees" or "guests," rather than as "tenants." Moreover, the landlord was considered to be an "innkeeper." In this context, the relations between these two actors are governed by the *Innkeepers Act*, the legal text which lays out the rights and obligations of all hotel owners and their guests in the province. In effect, this Act covers guests and owners of the luxurious Hyatt Hotel, as well as those living in and owning decrepit residential hotels. The impact of residents being defined as licensee include (Tenants' Rights Coalition, 1986):

- Guests are only permitted between certain hours, and charged extra if they stay overnight.
- Eviction is permitted at any time for any reason.
- Guests' goods may be seized at any time.

What this classification system means is that even if residential hotel dwellers lived in a room for 25 years (as some of the Expo '86 evictees had), they were not afforded the barest of protection from the actions of the building manager or owner. Community and housing activists had been attempting to change this situation for years before the Expo evictions, but were unsuccessful because the Provincial Government refused to act. This left the hotel dweller in a precarious housing situation.

2.3.2 Expo '86's Next Door Neighbour: The Downtown Eastside

Vancouver's Downtown Eastside community bounds the northern and eastern edges of Expo '86. The 1981 Census found 16,608 people living in the Downtown Eastside and just under half (45 percent) residing in lodging houses (residential hotels, rooming houses, non-profit hostels and multiple conversion dwellings). A 1986 survey by the City of Vancouver Social Planning Department registered approximately 9,600 lodging house units in the Downtown Eastside.

It is the lodging house population (the residential hotel residents in particular) that is under examination in this case study. The average lodging house resident is characterized by the Downtown Eastside Residents Association (DERA, 1987, pp. 7-8):

If there is a typical Downtown Eastside resident, he is an unemployed man, about 55 years old, receiving social assistance, and living alone in a small housekeeping room for which he pays \$225 a month. He probably has lived in the community in a variety of lodging houses, on and off, for the past 15 years. He has previously worked in primary industries (e.g., logging, mining) and may have become disabled while working.

Residents of the Downtown Eastside tend to be fiercely independent individuals with links to informal social support systems. A strong sense of community exists in the Downtown Eastside.

The residents of the Downtown Eastside have been represented by the Downtown Eastside Residents Association (DERA) since 1973. This community organization was formed after residents became upset with decades of intransigence and neglect which they had been forced to endure. In the last two decades, DERA has become involved in a wide array of activities including critical analyses of plans for the area, lobbying, affordable housing development, et cetera. Led by Jim Green for the past decade, DERA is one of Canada's most organized and powerful community organizations, and has received much attention from the media, and academics (see, for example, Gerecke, 1991; Ley and Hasson, 1994). When the Expo eviction crisis began, DERA had approximately 4000 members.




Figure 1. The Downtown Eastside (as defined by the Downtown Eastside Residents' Association), the Expo '86 site, and a nearby redevelopment site owned by Marathon Realty. (Source: Tamaki, 1991)

2.3.3 The Expo '86 Eviction Saga

The first questions about the possible housing impacts of Expo '86 (then called Transpo '86) and B.C. Place were raised during the summer of 1981, one-half year after the Bureau of International Exhibitions (BIE) officially ratified the Expo application. In the Downtown Eastside, First United Church representatives predicted that at least 800 low- and fixed-income residents would be evicted from residential hotels and rooming houses being upgraded for the Expo '86 lucrative tourist trade (Lyotier and Shuter, 1982; Rankin, 1981; Save the Downtown Eastside Committee, 1982). Concerns about the potential for evictions at this time were voiced publicly by DERA, and they initiated a research project to discover what impacts occurred in previous host cities where hallmark events were held.

In response to community concerns and calls from some local politicians for preventative planning, the City of Vancouver Social Planning Department initiated work in October 1983 on a major initiative called the *Expo Housing Program*. This program involved seeking additional housing assistance from the Canada and Mortgage Housing Corporation (CMHC) to offset potential Expo-related housing impacts. It was planned to have community groups in the Downtown Eastside, such as DERA, manage the newly constructed housing projects if the plan was accepted by the Federal Government.

The Social Planning Department and DERA developed various other options in 1984. The most important and controversial of these was a rent freeze and no eviction program. This option was initially proposed by DERA and refined with Social Planning staff input. In the proposal, the long-term residents (over one year) of lodging houses would receive protection from either rent increases or evictions during the period of operation of Expo '86. This option required Provincial Government approval because the City did not have legal authority to enact either rent controls or eviction protection.

By June of 1985 the results of a Social Planning Department survey entitled *Expo Housing Survey* were in. In the report it was noted that a large majority of hotel operators would not be undergoing major upgrading specifically for Expo '86 until the last possible moment—January or February, 1986. DERA stepped up its lobbying activities and pressured all levels of government, as well as the Expo '86 authorities to take preventative action. Local community meetings were held on the subject.

The *Expo Housing Survey* prediction, in addition to a lack of support from the Expo '86 organization and both senior levels of government for the *Expo Housing Program*, caused DERA and the Social Planning Department to focus on the "ounce of prevention" option—time-limited, no-rent increase, no-eviction legislation applied to long-term residents of residential hotels. By August 13, 1985 this option had come before Vancouver City Council for approval. It failed to pass as Council split 5-5 on the

motion to request the Provincial Government to amend either the City Charter or the *Residential Tenancy Act* until October 13, 1986 (the day Expo was scheduled to close). There was firm opposition to this option from various members of City Council including Alderman (now Mayor) Gordon Campbell, who aligned himself with the B.C. Hotels' Association. Their perspective was that no hotel owners intended to evict tenants. Rather, in the words of Campbell, rent freeze advocates were "trying to set up a bunch of straw men and burn them down ... The hotels in the Downtown Eastside are not going to be prime locations for Expo" (Minovitz, 1985). The same motion was entertained by City Council one month later, and it too failed to receive majority support.

By February 1986 at the exact time predicted by the Social Planning Department, forced evictions began to occur. Lodging house managers began evicting large numbers of short- and long-term residents in order to complete minor renovations so that they could attempt to rent the units to Expo '86 tourists.

Once the media began covering the sight of poor, elderly, and often handicapped people being forced out of their homes, City Council addressed the matter again. On February 25, 1986 Council finally passed a motion requesting the Provincial Government to legislate an end to the evictions. Certain members of City Council continued to oppose this option. A public debate was held on the same day in the Downtown Eastside community. Mayor Mike Harcourt represented the City, Jimmy Pattison represented Expo '86 (Pattison was president of the Expo '86 Corporation), and Jim Green represented DERA.

Empathetic members of City Council and DERA hoped that Pattison would lobby the Provincial Government for the proposed legislative action if he could be convinced that the situation was severe. Countless evictees paraded before Pattison to tell their story (see Kelly, 1986, for a critical analysis of this "self-made millionaire"). However, the Provincial Government refused to act because they did not perceive the evictions to be a serious problem.

As the pace of evictions increased during the latter days of February, a major protest march was organized by DERA and other local groups, which attracted considerable media attention.

Six days after the rally, a Provincial-City Task Force was created and the City (via the Social Planning Department) was pressured into creating a "clearing house" to relocate tenants. At this time, tension in the community was extreme, with concern over the scale of the evictions and the potential health problems associated with evicting elderly, poor, and often unhealthy people. The media covered the eviction issue with detailed daily reports during this period which were generally empathetic towards the evictees.



Figure 2. A Vancouver residential hotel which evicted long-term tenants to renovate rooms for Expo '86 visitors.




Figure 3. Jimmy Pattison (left), Chairman of Expo 86; Mike Harcourt (middle), Mayor of Vancouver; and Jim Green (right), DIRA Organizer, at a public debate over the Expo '86 evictions.

During March and April, both the City and DERA continued to lobby the Provincial Government for legislative action, while identifying actions the City and community could take to slow the pace of evictions. By late May the evictions had slowed to a trickle and the Social Planning Department considered closing the housing registry. A "Concert For The Evicted" was held featuring such luminaries of social protest as Pete Seeger and Arlo Guthrie.

In the summer 1986, Expo-related evictions stopped taking place, and the housing registry set up in Carnegie Centre was closed. The City's Health Department and DERA continued to monitor the health status of the evictees. Little effort was devoted to lobbying for legislative action because of the waning of the eviction crisis, and because by now it was apparent the Provincial Government would not support legislative action. Expo '86 closed in October, and the vacancy rate of Downtown Eastside lodging houses returned to normal (approximately 10-20 percent) by spring 1987.

In summary, the Downtown Eastside community, as represented by DERA, actively sought, through a variety of strategies, to prevent forced evictions from occurring. Prior to the start of the forced evictions, DERA undertook:

- Background research on the tenuous situation for area residents.
- Research on previous host cities of hallmark events.
- Hosting of public information meetings.
- Development of strategies to leverage permanent affordable housing out of the Expo area.
- Development of a temporary rent freeze/no eviction plan via changes to municipal regulations and the *Landlord Tenant Act*.
- Lobbying of all levels of government, and the Expo '86 Board.
- Media campaigns.

Once the evictions started, the community attempted to both halt the evictions, as well as lessen the social impacts of the evictions. DERA specifically undertook:

- Lobbying of all levels of government and the Expo Board.
- Working with supportive City politicians and officials on various initiatives.
- Relocation of evictees.
- Documentation of issues—research and art.
- Protest rallies.
- Media campaigns.

Initiation of a boycott campaign of residential hotel bars that were evicting residents.

All strategies were explicitly based upon the principle of the right to housing, and the right to community self-determination (J. Green, personal communication).

2.3.4 The Social Impacts of Expo '86

As noted above, generally four different types of housing impacts were created. There were three types of impacts in the Vancouver case.

Post-Announcement Speculative Impact

Following the announcement of Expo '86 and the B.C. Place development in 1980, some land speculation began occurring in the Downtown Eastside. Examination of data detailing changes in the value of downtown residential hotels points to a destabilized market which is characterized by a rapid increase in land values, or change in ownership.

Similar conclusions can be drawn from examination of the Social Planning Department lodging house surveys carried out during 1983, 1985 and 1986. Substantial housing loss has occurred in the Downtown Eastside since 1978. Various estimates of the loss put it between 1,000 and 2,000 units for the period of 1978 to 1984. This is supported by data from the 1986 survey which shows a permanent loss of approximately 600 lodging house units (primarily sleeping/housekeeping units) between 1984 and 1986. As the Mayor of Vancouver put it:

In the past four years, about 80 private rooming houses—which provided more than 2,000 rooms for low-income families and individuals—have closed down. Some have been converted to non-residential use, others have been demolished. (Harcourt, 1984a)

Shaylor (1986) and Hulchanski (1989) also documented this trend.



SAVE OUR HOUSING SAVE OUR PARKS RALLY

DATE: Saturday March 1, 1986

TIME: 1:00 pm

PLACE: ACROSS FROM CRAB PARK
(on Alexander between
Main and Columbia)

ENTERTAINMENT



THE ISSUES:

- EVICTIONS
- RENT INCREASES
- TRAFFIC
- EXPO PARKING
- PARK PROTECTION

REFRESHMENTS



EVERYONE WELCOME

SPONSORED BY:

**THE DOWNTOWN EASTSIDE RESIDENTS' ASSOCIATION (DERA)
THE CREATE A REAL AVAILABLE BEACH COMMITTEE (CRAB)**

Figure 4. Poster advertising a community rally over the Expo '86 evictions, and the threat of a possible Expo parking lot next to a community park.




Figure 5. This chart is generated by examining land and building values in a sample of 70 downtown lodging houses in four sub-areas of what we have called the Downtown Eastside. As land values in the area increase, the relative value of the building decreases, signifying redevelopment pressure on the housing stock as the whole component (land+building) is not being used to its maximum economic potential. Note the drop in the ratio following the 1980 announcement of B.C. Place and Expo '86 and the general trend towards increased redevelopment pressure on the stock throughout this whole period. (Source: Ley and Olds, forthcoming)

Thus, Expo '86 had a destabilizing effect upon land values (and therefore housing supply) in the Downtown Eastside prior to the opening of the fair. Other contributing factors include core commercial expansion, the expansion of Chinatown, the low profit margins of this type of rental housing, the enforcement of City standard of maintenance bylaws, and general urban redevelopment pressures.

Pre-Expo Tourist Accommodation Supply Impact

This form of housing impact occurs when landlords evict tenants from housing units in order to rent the unit to people working for, or visiting the hallmark event. Generally, the rooms receive minor renovations (e.g., paint) once the original inhabitants have been evicted.

The exact number of Downtown Eastside lodging house residents who were displaced because of Expo '86-induced pressure was a controversial issue. Estimates between a low of "a few" and a high of 2,000 evictees have been suggested by politicians, planners and community representatives. After examination of various data sources (government and community reports, press clippings, and interviews with key actors) it is estimated by the author that between 500 and 850 evictions occurred in the Downtown Eastside lodging houses because of pre-Expo tourist demand impact. In addition, between 1,000 and 1,500 lodging house rooms were switched from monthly rental to tourist rental status during the spring of 1986. To put some perspective on both of these figures, the 1981 census tabulates approximately 7,461 lodging house tenants living in the Downtown Eastside, and as of April 1986, approximately 9,600 lodging house units in the Downtown Eastside (Social Planning Department, 1983, p. 26).

It should be noted that evictions were both direct (for example eviction notices) and indirect (in the form of rent increases or implementation of strict regulations banning cooking in the rooms).

The evictions had significant negative social implications for the displaced residents. Individuals were forced to relocate, either privately or with assistance, to another housing unit. In cases where suitable vacant units could not be found in the Downtown Eastside, some evictees were offered vacant public housing units in outlying suburban districts. Many evictees moved to another unit, only to be evicted for a second time. The impact in the case of Expo '86 is amplified because the average Downtown Eastside resident is unemployed, elderly, poor and either handicapped or in a weak state of health. These residents could not adequately deal with the physical and psychological stress brought on by the eviction. As one evictee noted:

I'm not going to move unless they force me out. I'm not a piece of garbage. I've been here three years and don't mind if they raise the rent, but I won't move ... Once you get used to a place, it's like a pair of shoes, they're comfortable. Even if they get worn out you still put your old shoes on. This hotel to me is home. You go to the beer parlor, you know everybody ... I like this place but what they've done—it's inhuman.

(Evictee Jon Muller, 59, cited in Hume, March 8, 1986)

Some of the evictees who faced health problems after being evicted include Olaf Solheim, an 80-year old man who "made a conscious decision to stop living" because of the stress associated with the eviction (Dr. J. Blatherwick, personal communication) or two men who committed soon suicide after receiving their eviction notices. Jim Green, DERA organizer, stated that eleven evictees had died as of March 1988 and numerous others experienced negative health impacts (personal communication).

Post-Expo Impact

While Expo '86 was operating, a high proportion of the owners and operators of residential hotels where residents were evicted failed to see their dreams of financial gain materialize. Significant negative publicity occurred because of the evictions and the poor quality of the renovation work. Also, Downtown Eastside residents stopped frequenting the bars of hotels where residents were evicted. This action cut off an important source of revenue.

Following the closure of Expo '86, many residential hotels attempted to attract back previous residents. Some of the hotels initially attempted to continue catering to tourists but they met with mixed results. By spring 1988 only one hotel which was formerly renting to long-term Downtown Eastside residents has remained a tourist hotel. Many hotels borrowed money to renovate and failed to make up this cost. Consequently, several of the hotels where residents were evicted went into receivership and some have been sold. The rent levels in lodging houses returned to pre-Expo rates after Expo '86 closed and the vacancy rate as of October 1987 was approximately equal to the rate recorded over one year before Expo opened.

Between 1986 and 1992, residential hotels have continued to be demolished or closed down in the Downtown Eastside (Hulchanski, 1989; Ley and Olds, forthcoming). Between 1985 and 1989, approximately 1,150 units were lost, leaving approximately 9,000 units in total (1989). This trend continues to the present day, with pressures being exerted on the stock from a variety of redevelopment initiatives in the downtown area including Pacific Place, the urban mcga-project which is beginning to be built on the Expo site (Beazley, 1992). Some efforts are being made to

develop non-profit housing in the Downtown Eastside to offset the loss of lodging houses (Hulchanski, Eberle, Olds, and Stewart, 1991). Indeed, an ironic impact of the Expo '86 evictions was that it spurred DERA on to become involved in affordable housing *development* and they now manage over 600 units of housing in the community. (The newest project will be called Solheim Place, in honour of Olaf Solheim who died after being evicted). However, given inadequate and steadily decreasing funds for non-profit housing programs in Canada, future trends will most likely have a negative impact upon *existing* Downtown Eastside residents.

2.4 Community Action and Impact: The Critical Factors

Clearly, the community played a very active role in attempting to prevent forced evictions from occurring in the first place. Once the evictions started, rigorous efforts were made to force all levels of government to halt the disruptive impacts by using legal means. However, the community goals were only supported by some of the local politicians, including the Mayor, and they in turn had no success in pressuring the Provincial Government to halt the evictions. Could the dislocation of between 500 and 850 Downtown Eastside residents have been prevented if both City Council and the Provincial Government had acted upon the DERA/Social Planning Department recommendation for a preventative rent freeze/no eviction legislation option? The answer is yes. However, the process of addressing issues such as housing rights and housing policy is an inherently political process which is structured according to the particular ideology of each party involved. Ideological differences and political jurisdiction also effect the issue. The main community goal (and City goal once the evictions began) of ensuring that the potential permanent or temporary displacement of long-term low- and moderate-income residents be stopped or held to a minimum was not attained. Why?

The recommendation for preventative legislation met stiff opposition as soon as it was publicly considered in late 1984. At the municipal level, the mere suggestion of the possibility of evictions, let alone the consideration of a legislative solution, was considered to be "political" by several alderman. For example, in September, 1985 one alderman stated:

I think it's an arbitrary and political type of action which doesn't serve anybody's needs in the long run ... I think that this has been a scare campaign that frankly, is strictly politically motivated and not one based on any kind of fact ... It should be a non-issue but I think some people are trying to make it an issue. (Rogers Cable TV, Vancouver, September, 1985)

At the provincial level, the government refused to heed the recommendation of City Council for a legislative solution to the eviction crisis. Comments in the media suggest provincial politicians

perceived legislative action preventing evictions and rent increases to be an "unneeded" and "unfair "intervention' in the market-place." They would more likely give "assistance" for these people to move. Michael Walker (an advisor to the governing Social Credit party) stated that "displaced rooming house tenants" would:

save everyone a lot of trouble if they all were put on buses to the Kootenays [a region of B.C. 300 miles from Vancouver]... the world runs by greed ... everyone is greedy in one way or another. What we're talking about is relative greed. It's not a question of dire necessity. It's a question of choice of location. People are saying 'I don't want to live in the Kootenays ... I want to live where the action is.' (Glavin, April 23, 1986)

When Vancouver mayor Mike Harcourt asked Walker about the proposed legislative solution, Walker replied: "Isn't it morally wrong to do that" (*Ibid.*). Another Fraser Institute spokesperson also presented such views in a Vancouver newspaper column (Block, March 25, 1986).

The Provincial Government refused to seriously consider a legislative solution for the pre-Expo tourist accommodation supply impact of Expo '86. Instead, they put their full weight behind relocating tenants through the housing registry. The Province felt that evictees should be grateful for this "assistance." For example, when several evictees displayed reluctance to move into distant suburban social housing units far from their community, Jack Kempf, Minister of Lands, Parks and Housing stated:

The old adage that you can lead a horse to water but you can't make him drink sure holds true in this situation. You can provide all the accommodation you want to those so-called evictees but you can't make them move into it. (*Vancouver Sun*, May 14, 1986, p. A12)

The Provincial Government and some Vancouver aldermen deemed the housing registry a suitable option for dealing with the housing impacts of Expo '86 because it was a "positive" solution to place "these people in appropriate accommodation" (Alderman Gordon Campbell, CBC Radio, June 2, 1985). More importantly, such an option permitted the inner city to be redeveloped. In a February 26, 1986 BCTV News Hour program Bill Ritchie, Minister of Municipal Affairs, was interviewed. He stated "despite hardship of individuals, development must take place." Also, a *Vancouver Province* article quoted Premier Bill Bennett as saying that legislation aimed at preventing evictions would also stop redevelopment:

'Handling problems of people, and also encouraging the removal of areas that in many communities could also be called slum areas' are the government priorities he said. ("Bill Won't Take Blame," April 25, 1986, p. 27)

Although the resources and power existed at the political level to prevent evictions (thereby acknowledging the residents have at least some housing rights), a decision was made to allow the evictions to occur. This is because the world-view of the politicians reflects a philosophy which values the exchange-value of housing and not the use-value; a belief in the primacy of economic relations; a belief that the inner city must be redeveloped; and a belief that Downtown Eastside residents do not live in a "community." Rather, Downtown Eastside residents were considered by those with power to live in a geographic area without bonds to the physical or social environment. The right to housing, including security of tenure, simply does not exist unless you can purchase this right with adequate personal income. This philosophy continues to demonstrate itself in the early 1990s as affordable, albeit often inadequate housing, in Vancouver's poorest community continues to disappear in the face of market-led redevelopment pressures and inadequate government protection.

3. CALGARY—THE 1988 WINTER OLYMPICS

3.1 The Calgary Context

Located approximately 100 kilometres east of the Rocky Mountains, Calgary (pop. 650,000 in 1988) is the capital of Canada's oil and gas industry, and also acts as a major "agri-business" centre for the three prairie provinces.



Figure 6. Map of Alberta and bordering provinces. (Source: Calgary Economic Development Authority, 1990)

Calgary has grown rapidly since the 1960s. Employment opportunities in a variety of economic sectors has attracted in-migrants from across Canada. The population has swollen with an educated white-collar labour force (indeed, it is the most educated population of all Canadian cities), most of whom seek a comfortable existence in sprawling suburban settlements. Links to the past remain however. Calgary is home to the Calgary Stampede, an annual July event with cattle tying contests, chuck wagon races, and hearty breakfasts. The mythology surrounding the Stampede continues on in the later part of the twentieth century even though the majority of the population makes a living in enclosed office space (Campbell, 1984). This event, and plans for the Stampede site, are linked to the Olympic Games as well (see section 5.3.2), and they have contributed to the destabilization and likely breakup of a lower-income community bordering the Stampede site.

The 1988 Winter Olympics represents an important stage in the planned image transformation of this former western Canadian "cow town" to that of a more international city—a city which presents its inhabitants and visitors with "world class" recreational activities, high-tech manufacturing opportunities, and tourism thrills (Calgary Economic Development Authority, 1988; Scott, 1992). In keeping with the tradition of boosterism and pro-growth goals which long characterized prairie cities like Calgary (Artibise and Stelter, 1979; Reasons, 1984) the Games were designed to act as a catalyst to boost the city into the "twenty-first century." For example, Hiller (1990, p. 133) suggests that the "Olympics symbolized the urban transformation in both population growth and downtown expansion that recently had occurred in the city, and the Olympic Games became the vehicle to make a statement about this transformation to the world." As such, the hopes of the city's economic and political elite rested with the successful operation of the Games. While not without division, it is apparent that the goal of "everyone" contributing to "the cause" was an overriding element which coloured most interactions, not the least of which were eviction and displacement processes.

3.2 The 1988 Calgary Winter Olympics

From February 13 - 28, 1988, Calgary hosted the XV Olympic Winter Games. Fifty-seven countries participated in the most expensive Winter Games in history. Over 180,000 people visited Calgary to watch the Games at six venues in and around the metropolitan region. An estimated 1.5 billion people watched the Games over their 16 day stretch on television.

The bid for the 1988 Calgary Winter Olympic Games was initiated by the Calgary Olympic Development Association (CODA). CODA was formed in 1960 in order to prepare a bid for the 1964 Winter Olympic Games. While unsuccessful at this time, the organization remained in existence (with brief periods of hiatus) and put in bids for both the 1968 and 1972 Games, though

they too were awarded to other cities. Bid preparatory work for the 1988 Games began in 1978 with Frank King, chairman of CODA (who later became Chairman of OCO) acting as catalyst. The bid was a collaborative effort with CODA coordinating the bid and support (financial and otherwise) coming from the Calgary Booster Club, the Canadian Olympic Association, the City of Calgary, the Province of Alberta, the Government of Canada, and the University of Calgary, and a large number of interested organizations and individuals (Hiller, 1990, p. 122). The main players were a cross-section of Calgary's business and government elite, and they had very strong links to the ruling provincial political party, the Progressive Conservatives. The bid cost approximately \$2 million to prepare.

The bid was designed to leverage funding for legacies from the provincial and federal governments, as well as from the Olympic organizing organization OCO'88 (Olympiques Calgary Olympics). Strong financial commitment on the part of senior levels of government also helped sell the bid to the IOC. For example, the Federal Government committed up to \$200 million in 1979 towards the Games. This figure represented approximately 50 percent of the total Games budget at the time of the bid. The final budget for the Games was approximately \$1 billion (MacLeans, 1988, p. 13).

On September 30, 1981, the Games were awarded to Calgary. The OCO'88 was enlisted to turn the plans from the bid book into reality. As with most bid books though, new ideas and realism meshed to create a somewhat different result. The budget doubled, as did revenue projections. The organizers pushed for the creation of even more *new* facilities in order to leave Calgary with as many legacies as possible (*XV Winter Olympics Official Report*, p. 53). In the end, over \$350 million was spent on athletic facilities on sites both in and throughout the Calgary region.

The many permanent legacies of the Games were funded by variable contributions from the federal, provincial and municipal governments, as well as OCO '88. Legacies include: a \$98 million Olympic Caddledome Stadium, a \$72 million Canada Olympic Park (bob sleigh, luge, ski jumping, and skiing facilities); a \$28 million addition to University buildings; a \$5.9 million Broadcast Hill Media Village that contained 27 three-storey walk-up apartment blocks of 266 residential suites. This housing reverted to private ownership upon conclusion of the Games. It was built by the owner earlier than it might otherwise have been in return for the above noted financial contributions. In addition there was a \$5 million Lincoln Park Media Village consisting of 2500 beds in 550 Atco Trailers. Most of these units were presold to the federal and provincial governments, moved following the Games to rural Alberta, and converted into low-cost housing. Some were relocated to the nearby Mount Royal College and now act as student housing (*XV Winter Olympic Official Report*, 1988; *Macleans*, 1988; City of Calgary, 1988; P. Fraser, personal communication; King, 1991; Hiller, 1987; Reasons, 1984). The Games also created a variety of economic impacts. The

Official Report suggests that \$1.4 billion in economic benefits were created with \$506 million consisting of capital projects and improvements, \$310 million in operations and planning, \$150 million in visitor expenditures, and \$424 million in induced economic effects (*XV Winter Olympics Official Report*, p. 79). Rooney suggests that there were \$449 million of economic impact in Calgary, and \$650 million of impacts in the rest of Canada (1988, p. 99, cited in Hall, 1992). An estimated \$30 million in profit was made from these Games (Rooney, 1988, p. 99; *XV Winter Olympics Official Report*).

3.3 Evictions, Displacement and Community Action in Calgary

The 1988 Calgary Winter Olympic Games caused, or contributed to, four main types of housing impacts, and each generated a specific form of community action. Before these impacts are discussed however, it is important to briefly outline the institutional context (i.e., the laws which affect housing, landlord and tenant relations, and political jurisdiction).

3.3.1 Housing Rights and the Legal Framework in Calgary, Alberta

The laws governing landlord and tenant relations (as of 1988) played a key role in *facilitating* the evictions associated with the Calgary Winter Olympics. As with the Expo '86 case, it is the province which has the jurisdiction to create laws affecting security of tenure and rent levels.

While a tenant is afforded various rights and obligations in Alberta, such as not being disturbed by a landlord (for instance by surprise inspections), having a safe and clean premise, and receiving back his/her damage deposit with interest when moving out, there are two major aspects that undermine security of tenure.

First, tenants can be evicted *without cause*, providing the landlord gives the tenant 90 days notice. In 1988, Albertan landlords could evict a tenant for whatever reason, from disliking the colour of their hair (or skin), to wanting the suite vacant in order to rent to Olympic tourists. Second, a landlord is legally permitted to raise rent levels by any amount, provided 90 days notice is given. The tenant has no recourse if rent levels are increased by, for example, 1000 per cent. The consequences of these two aspects of the Alberta *Landlord and Tenant Act* is that tenants are open to eviction and displacement at any time, and they have no option but to move if they receive an eviction notice, or if the rent is raised beyond their financial means.

It is also important to note that in 1988, students living in non-self-contained residences (that is a room that does not contain a kitchen or washroom within its space) were not covered by the

Landlord and Tenant Act. Rather, they were considered to be "licensees" (a condition offering even less security of tenure), while residents of residential hotels and rooming houses were covered by the *Inn Keepers Act* (P. Fraser, personal communication). This *Act* is less protective of the rights of tenants as well, and they can be evicted at a moments notice, or have their rent levels raised by any amount, at any time.

3.3.2 Victoria Park and the Saddledome Impacts

Discussion of the social impacts of the Calgary Olympics must go back to 1980 and the preparation of the Olympic bid. As noted above, one of the main aims of hosting the Games was to leave Calgary with a range of legacies in the form of modern "world class" athletic facilities. Calgarians had long desired a large covered stadium which could be used for ice hockey as well as other sporting, music, cultural, and convention events. This goal developed into a commitment which enabled Calgary to be awarded a National Hockey League franchise and the right to sponsor the Olympic Games. With the Games bid as a backdrop, the Calgary Flames, a professional ice hockey team with the National Hockey League began playing in 1980 (Hiller, 1989). The franchise for the Flames was awarded in expectation that a new ice hockey arena would be built.

Several options for locating the building were under consideration in 1980. The Calgary Exhibition and Stampede property in the inner city was one option desired by CODA and the Stampede Board, a group of Calgary elites who run this non-profit organization constituted as a joint-stock corporation (Campbell, 1984, p. 108; Gray, 1985). The Calgary Exhibition and Stampede leases Stampede Park from the City, and they sponsor the famous "Calgary Stampede" where a host of events are held every summer. Unfortunately, the inner-city grounds are located next to Victoria Park, one of Calgary's oldest and poorest neighbourhoods. This community has a long and colourful history, and is made up of wood frame single family houses. From the early 1960s on, it has provided some of Calgary's most affordable housing, primarily in older single-family houses, many of which have been converted into rooming houses (City of Calgary Planning Department, 1980). The proximity next to the Stampede grounds has provided for a long series of conflicts, primarily because of repeated Stampede expansion plans (Reid, 1991/92; Spirit of Stampede, 1992; City of Calgary Planning Department, 1980). For example, in 1968 City Council permitted the Stampede to expropriate eight city blocks of Victoria Park for expansion purposes.

In this context, and given that many of the Olympic boosters were also on or linked to the Stampede Board, it was not surprising to hear expressions of support for the siting of the stadium next to Victoria Park in the northern end of the Stampede grounds. Both CODA and the Stampede Board favoured this location. Debate raged over where to site the stadium in late 1980 and early 1981, the same time that

the Olympic bid was being finalized with City Council. CODA, citizen's groups, Victoria Park residents and Stampede representatives all lobbied over the issue. During the course of debate, a split developed in the community. The Victoria Park Community Association categorically opposed siting the Saddledome on the Stampede grounds, while the Victoria Park Property Owners Association supported siting the Saddledome on the grounds provided efforts were made by OCO '88 to tie the Games to a community revitalization strategy (M. Giammarco, personal communication). At this time the City Planning Department quickly produced a preliminary impact study which acknowledged the difficulty in involving the community in the decision making process given the time collapse. In 1981, as the date neared for submission of the Olympic bid, the siting issue was being considered by the City's Development Appeal Board (DAB). The Victoria Park Community Association had gained access to the DAB via a Court of Queen's Bench injunction (a court order). However, City Council convinced the Provincial Government to pass an order-in-council suspending city planning regulations, and cancelling the court order. This enabled the City to authorize siting the stadium next to Victoria Park (Macintosh and Whitson, 1992, p. 118). The mayor of Calgary suggested that there was a need to "demonstrate to the World Olympic Committee that Calgary was capable of hosting the Winter Olympics" (Campbell, 1984, p. 118). The City, CODA and the Stampede Board had an expedient end to the public deliberations at the expense of local community desires and participatory democracy.

Construction on the stadium proceeded at a fast pace in 1982 and was completed by the fall of 1983. The stadium cost \$98 million (a 13 percent cost overrun) (*XV Winter Olympics Official Report*, p. 57) and is topped with a distinctive saddle-like roof of arguable aesthetic and symbolic qualities. It seats approximately 20,000 people and is permanent home to the Calgary Flames ice hockey team.

In 1984, an Area Redevelopment Plan (ARP) was developed and adopted by City Council for Victoria Park. This plan, attempted to spur on new private sector residential development, in contrast to previous attempts at rehabilitation of existing dwellings (Reid, 1991/92, p. 36). The plan "detailed a vision of a neighbourhood with a significant commercial component and enough high density residential development to significantly further the City's inner-city housing objectives" (Spirit of Stampede, 1992).

Between 1984 and 1988, the plan had little impact as far as improving quality of life for Victoria Park residents (M. Giammarco, personal communication; Spirit of Stampede, 1992). Indeed, people continued to move out of the community. *Reasons* (1984, p. 78), for example, notes that Victoria Park was hit hard by the siting of the Stadium, with 1,013 residents moving out in 1983 though he fails to detail the impact. It is clear though that population has declined in the area. The population of Victoria Park East, where the main impacts of the Stampede have been felt was 2,300 in 1976, 1,482 in 1980, and only 1,000 in 1990—clear signs of out-migration and negative change (City of Calgary Planning



Figure 7. 1991 photograph of Olympic “gateway” over Victoria Park intersection.

Department, 1977; Reid, 1991/92). It should also be noted that the 1984 ARP was passed at the start of a three-year worldwide recession, when little residential development took place anywhere in Canada.

Interestingly, a small sum of City capital (\$22,000) was spent on “beautification” in the area prior to the Games (City of Calgary, 1988, p. 95). Houses on the main road through “the near slum district” of Victoria Park were painted in order to “spruce up” the view of tourist’s and athletes on their way to “our magnificent hockey arena” (King, 1991). Houses off the main road were not painted. The revitalization initiative desired by the Victoria Park Property Owners Association in exchange for support of the Saddledome siting was not carried through (M. Giammarco, personal communication). Instead, the community retains Olympic “mementos” which symbolize the encroachment of the Games, broken promises, and the age of spectacle into a residential neighbourhood fighting for it’s survival.

The many forces acting on Victoria Park have created unstable conditions which give potential resident investors cause for worry. Why rehabilitate or move into a community which seems to be on the gradual slide to non-existence? In 1980 during the battle over the siting of the Saddledome, area residents stated:

[F]or those who argue that the area is run-down and, therefore, has no future, we offer a simple fact; the community has never had the security of permanence long enough to allow proper development to occur. As long as the threat of expansion northward by the Calgary Exhibition and Stampede persists, Victoria Park has no chance to be rejuvenated. (City of Calgary Planning Department, 1980, p. 51)

Twelve years later, in response to a current Stampede Board Plan to demolish the entire Victoria Park community, Spirit of Stampede (1992, Appendix A, p.5) echoed the same concerns:

While it is true that a lack of new development has led to Victoria Park East becoming run-down, many believe that the underlying cause has been the ever-present threat of Stampede expansion.

The community has been exhausted given the continuous nature of this struggle. The entire weight of the establishment and the strength of their political forces has been extremely difficult to alter. Indeed, it has been impossible to appeal to the Provincial Government for assistance because of the interlocking nature of local and provincial economic and political elites. As one area resident put it, powerful actors are acting in a manner more associated with "secretive Eastern Bloc countries" which have since fallen in their attempt to "destroy community" (M. Giammarco, personal communication) to satisfy their goals for the Stampede.

3.3.3 Evictions from Rental Apartments

As in other cities which have hosted hallmark events, tenants in Calgary were evicted from rental apartment units because landlords attempted to use the units for short-term economic gain. Moreover, the specific nature of the eviction process was structured by the legal context. In Alberta, landlord and tenant laws strongly favour the landlord. This bias effectively enabled and encouraged landlords to evict tenants where Olympic opportunity was perceived.

In Calgary, evictions appear to have primarily occurred in two large apartment complexes.

Riverside Towers and the Point McKay Complex

A luxury apartment complex of two towers and one townhouse style building located near Canada Olympic Park was temporarily rented to Olympic visitors, and tenants were "encouraged" to move, though they had little option to do otherwise given Alberta's *Landlord and Tenant Act*. The owner of the towers devised a scheme whereby they spent \$1 million upgrading the towers to "provide entertainment and services for the upscale clientele of corporate and sports executives" (Martin, March

19, 1987). The president of Riverside Towers, Bart Messier, estimated that "Olympic month" would generate total revenue of approximately \$9 million. To encourage tenants to move, an employee dressed as Santa Claus ran around handing out \$1,000 checks ("vacation bonuses") to some of the tenants and they promised to rent the units to them once the Games were over (Martin, March 19, 1987; M. Grey, personal communication).

In all, residents from 270 units were displaced in the towers, as were people living in 100 townhouse units. Given that, on average, at least two people live in a dwelling unit in Canada, it can be estimated that approximately 740 people were displaced because of Olympic-related housing impacts. Some of the resident owners of the townhouses would have willingly moved given the financial incentives, as would some of the tenants. However, all of the tenants had no choice but to relocate. The owners of the complex had the power and the desire to cater to Olympic visitors who would have the capacity to pay large sums of money for temporary housing. Moreover, as Riverside Towers president Bart Messier stated, "This opportunity is not going to come again...people have to realize how important it is to the city that we look after our guests" (Martin, March 19, 1987). The social pressure to contribute to the cause of the Games, in tandem with a perceived financial opportunity, and the weak nature of the tenancy laws, enabled the evictions to occur. As far as it can be ascertained, there was little resistance to the evictions. One tenant expressed moral indignation in the local newspaper over receiving a rent increase during this time (from \$600 to \$805), presumably to vacate a unit for the Olympic guests, though she did note that it was "not illegal" (*Ibid.*).

Rocky Mountain Court

In June 1987, residents living in 120 rental apartment units in Rocky Mountain Court received notice that they would have to vacate their units by November 1987 for five months. Approximately 51 of the units receiving notice of eviction were subsidized by the Alberta Mortgage and Housing Corporation for lower-income tenants (Martin, September 17, 1987). The Corporation agreed to let the owner of the building relocate tenants to other units in the building (Mitchell, June 19, 1987; Federation of Metro Tenants' Association, 1990). Most of the units were on the side of the building that faced Olympic Plaza, a public square used for daily Olympic medal ceremonies, fireworks, and other celebratory events.



Figure 8. Photograph of Rocky Mountain Court, which overlooks the Olympic Plaza.

The leasing of the units was arranged by OCO '88 for eventual use by Coca Cola corporation and other Olympic visitors (R. Ford, personal communication). The eviction letter sent to the tenants offered a variety of "compensatory" incentives such as relocation, one month's free rent, and moving costs. It was estimated that the owner of the building would be generating \$5,000 per unit (or \$1 million) for the period of the Olympic Games, as opposed to rents in the range of several hundred dollars per unit. The landlord stated that approximately \$500,000 was being spent on renovating and upgrading the building "for future tenants" (Martin, September 17, 1987).

The requirement to move, while offset by incentives, was a problem for many of the tenants. Comments from tenants included:

It seems like the same old thing that goes on with the Olympic sponsors ... They get the first choice. They're taking my home away from me. The same thing happened in Vancouver with Expo.

We weren't given a choice.

I put \$250 down on some drapes already. I don't know if I get that money back. I just moved in...I didn't want to move.

(Source: Martin, June 19, 1987, p. A1)

Angry tenants met several days later in June to discuss their options. At this meeting, one of the tenants stated "[E]verybody here is very upset ... We've been looking forward to the Olympics because of our convenient location; we've bought tickets and now they're kicking us out." Another resident stated "[T]he Olympics should be brotherly love through world-wide competition and somehow this is not mentioned" (Svoboda, June 22, 1987).

In contrast to the Riverside Towers case, the eviction notices at Rocky Mountain Court and the York Hotel (described below) generated a considerable amount of local press coverage (the press was notified of the evictions by disgruntled tenants), as well as some consternation on the part of local and provincial politicians, and OCO '88 officials. Initially, the mayor, Ralph Klein, attempted to use his status to create some pressure to resolve the issue as quickly as possible. Behind the scenes pressure was also put on the landlord by senior OCO '88 and City of Calgary officials to resolve the issue as quickly even though OCO '88 had no policy on the issue (B. Holmes, personal communication).

In the Rocky Mountain Court case, the Mayor of Calgary expressed his unhappiness with the potential "black eye" the evictions might cause Calgary. He suggested that "if people are being forced out, it's not the kind of thing we want to see happening. It's bad for the city ... but if it is an equitable deal and by consent, then it's OK by me" (Martin, June 19, 1987). The following day, the board of directors of OCO '88 asked the provincial appointee to OCO to see what could be done to address the issue. Several days later, Elaine McCoy, Minister, Ministry of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, announced the formation of a Ministerial Committee ("special investigation team") to look at all Olympics-related housing complaints (Board, June 30, 1987; J. Clouse, personal communication). The main aim of the committee was to act as an advisory and investigative body, and suggest ways to resolve any potential conflict in an "unbiased" manner (D. Luft, personal communication). The committee received 18 complaints in all from July to December 1987, and they "determined" that "only four" were related to the Games (Cattaneo, January 20, 1988). The committee disbanded in January 1988, stating that there were few problems to deal with.

In the end, after intervention in the matter by the Ministerial Committee and OCO officials, approximately 88 tenants moved from their suites in Rocky Mountain Court to satisfy the financial aims of the landlord. Of this total, 63 were relocated to other units in the building, and 25 moved out. The vice-president of the apartment management company "conceded many of the tenants [were] unhappy with the move, but said all but one accepted perks of free rent, moving allowances and packing assistance to pave the way for a corporate tenant occupancy during the Olympics." The incentives helped the landlords "stay friends with our tenants" he went on to state, adding "If we had them all mad at us and wanting to move out, we would have problems renting after the Olympics" (Martin, September 17, 1987).

3.3.4 Evictions from a Residential Hotel

Although the scale of residential hotel evictions was far less than in Vancouver, there were some evictions in Calgary. The York Hotel first tried to evict 75 tenants from 38 suites on three floors in November 1987. The mainly elderly and handicapped low-income tenants received a one page "Dear Guest" letter notifying them that they would have to vacate their units by December 31, 1987. The owners of the hotel had made some arrangements with OCO '88 a year earlier in July of 1986 to rent out 270 beds in the 38 units to the "Olympic family" (Donville and Haynes, November 15, 1987; R. Sandrin-Litt, personal communication).

As in the case of Rocky Mountain Court, the press was contacted by disgruntled tenants, and the following day the story hit the front pages of Calgary's major newspaper, the *Calgary Herald*. A number of initial tenant reactions to the eviction notice were covered in the paper:

I tell you it's no fun moving, man when you're old. No fun at all. They're pulling the same stunt they pulled in B.C. Someone must have offered them big money. OCO should be blamed too...they should have let us know when they pulled off the contract.

(Source: Donville and Haynes, November 15, 1987, p. A1)

The manager of the hotel, James Lo, defended his moves to evict tenants on such notice stating that all the tenants rented monthly like Rocky Mountain Court, and they were legally permitted to ask their tenants to move out (*Ibid.*).

The public nature of the controversy caused quick action on the part of OCO '88, particularly since the rooms were to be used by Olympic "guests." The following day Ron Sandrin-Litt, OCO's accommodation service manager publicly stated that the evictions were unnecessary, and that he would rather see the rooms empty than have long-term tenants forcibly evicted. He went on to add:

There's no need to push it to the limit, and take up all of that building. It's not a top priority ... It seems to me that there's plenty of room for compromise: we're flexible and Lo should know that. (Lamb, November 16, 1987).

It is interesting to note that a floor of female strippers working in the hotel were not served eviction notices with the rest of the tenants, presumably because they generated income beyond rent for the hotel owners.

Apart from Sandrin-Litt's public comments, OCO '88 directors, local politicians, and the Ministerial Committee noted above moved quickly to halt the controversy, ever wary of the Vancouver experience. They put behind the scenes pressure on the landlord through phone calls and a meeting to give the tenants the "option" of staying or leaving (B. Holmes, personal communication). Incentives were offered to tenants to move, much like the Rocky Mountain case and they were also told they would be relocated within the building to vacant suites as some would be required to move (Warwick, November 17, 1987, p. B1). They promised not to force anyone out in the middle of a cold Alberta winter. Two days after the tenants received their notices, the issue was seemingly resolved, and the editorial pages of the *Calgary Herald* publicly praised "diplomacy at the York" (November 17, 1987, p. A4). In the end, various Calgary contacts suggested that only a handful (several dozen) of York Hotel tenants moved out or relocated within the York Hotel, with most taking advantage of the incentives offered to move.

3.3.5 Evictions from Student Residences

Approximately 1,450 students were displaced from their residences for close to two months in 1988 because arrangements had been made to lease residence space at several Calgary educational institutions to the "Olympic Family."

The University of Calgary

The support of the University of Calgary was a critical component of the bid for the 1988 Winter Olympic Games, and it is unlikely that Calgary would have been chosen as host of the Games without the University's commitment (Reasons, 1984; P. Fraser, personal communication). Housing was the key component of the University's contribution to the Games. Having all of the athletes in one locale facilitates effective planning with respect to security and transportation. While University planners knew alternative arrangements would have to be made for the displaced students who were living in the housing and attending classes, they felt that the University (and the students) would gain in the long term from such an endeavour (P. Fraser, personal communication).

While the commitment was made to use student residences in 1978, and students had been receiving notice in their residence application forms of the impending plans since 1984, it was not until 1986, with the Games approaching fast, that the displacement became a political issue (during the course of a local election). This concern came out during a press conference on October 10, 1986 when student leaders charged the mayor of Calgary, Ralph Klein, with "passing the buck to OCO officials who don't seem interested in protecting the thousands of student renters who will lose their homes to athletes and tourists" ("Students Demand Housing Action," *Calgary Herald*, October 11, 1986, p. B2). Concerns were raised about the stress of moving mid-term in their educational programmes.

Public commitments were made by various officials to deal with the students' concerns, though University officials note they were addressing such issues from the start of the Olympic planning phase. The reversal of the student housing commitment was never considered. Instead, the University developed initiatives such as an "Adopt a Student Program" or moving assistance in order to be "fair" to the students (P. Fraser, personal communication).

At the University of Calgary, 1000 students were displaced, and approximately 87 percent of them returned upon completion of the Games two months later in March (*Ibid.*). University housing authorities feel that these students were assisted "as much as possible" during the Games period, and that they will benefit in the long term because of the many University legacies including sporting facilities, as well as the construction of 300 new housing units, which were effectively paid off because

of the Olympic contribution. The eviction of the University of Calgary students was clearly a disruption to the "class of 1988." Several expressed unhappiness with the temporary move (Mate, January 11, 1988). They paid the costs for the significant long-term University gain, and for the financial gain of subsequent students, even though they were not financially compensated.

The Southern Alberta Institute of Technology

As in the University of Calgary case, students at one other Calgary educational institution were temporarily evicted to make way for people associated with the Olympic Games. The Southern Alberta Institute of Technology (SAIT) leased its entire student residence for the period of January 1, 1988 to March 3, 1988. This 22 story building has 491 beds (students) in 204 apartments. In the end, a legacy fund of \$1 million was left because of this arrangement, and the interest it generates is used for housing improvements. Once the decision was made to lease the building, the students' association was involved in negotiations over what would be done to lessen the disruptive effects of the displacement. Students also discussed the issue with University of Calgary student residence organizations. Some assistance was made to locate alternative accommodation, and the students were permitted to move back into their suites once the Games were completed (N. Collin, personal communication; Cattaneo, November 1, 1986, p. A1).

3.4 Community Action and Impact: The Critical Factors

As noted in the text describing the housing impacts of the Calgary Winter Olympic Games, community resistance to such impacts had little ameliorative impact. The most significant resistance was expressed in Victoria Park. This resistance, outlined above, and by Reid (1991; 1991/1992), evolved, fractured, ebbed and flowed over *many* years of struggle since the 1965 decision to maintain the Stampede site next to Victoria Park instead of moving it to a suburban location. The main focus of this paper, Olympic-related impacts, marked the beginning of the end for Victoria Park. While resident action took many forms, and extracted some compromises such as the scaling down of initial plans to widen the gateway street to the Saddledome and Stampede grounds, they were unsuccessful in halting the construction of the Saddledome—the guarantor of future encroachment and possible destruction of their neighbourhood. Why?

There are a variety of factors which inhibited community action from achieving its aims. The factors are interrelated, and they reflect the nature of power, government and economy in Calgary.

Victoria Park is unfortunately situated next to the Calgary Stampede grounds. The Stampede, as noted above, and by Campbell (1984), is perceived by many to be a very important component of Calgary's tourism industry. Moreover, the Stampede has important cultural significance to the citizen's and elites of Calgary, though Reid (1991/1992) and Spirit of Stampede (1992) both note how the cultural significance of the Stampede has been distorted by the Stampede Board. Regardless, the Stampede was partnered with the Olympic Games, an event of international significance and "global opportunity." The perceived benefits of these events for Calgary created enough impetus that their organizers (mainly composed of the same people at senior levels) rammed through their plans regardless of community resistance from the Victoria Park Community Association. Simply put, the goals of a relatively powerless, low-income residential community next to one of the perceived "engines" of economic and cultural significance in Calgary, in conjunction with a spectacle of international scale, had little hope of being achieved given that they conflicted with the goals of the event's powerful boosters. Contributing factors to the powerlessness of Victoria Park include historical uncertainty over its future as outlined above, and a split within the community between the property owners and the community association as to whether the Games could be "used" for the benefit of the community.

In the two cases where people were evicted from rental apartments and a residential hotel, tenants expressed some *individual unhappiness with the moves to evict them*, but this did not lead to any significant individual or collective action. There appears to be *five* main reasons for the acquiescence.

First, as noted above, landlords in Alberta are legally permitted to evict tenants, and people living in residential hotels have virtually no rights with respect to protection from eviction or rent increases. The legal sanction of such action legitimizes eviction and displacement processes. Protests against evictions have no effective basis. Indeed, it is quite likely that the only reason even these minor expressions of unhappiness received public attention was because of their links to the Olympic Games, and the possibility of media attention. The State sanctioned the negation of the human right to housing in Alberta.

Second, landlords offered a variety of incentives to move—financial and otherwise. Given the point above, these incentives were perceived to be a "bonus" that one would not receive in any other case. Numerous people in Calgary interviewed for this study, apart from the tenants' organization representative, felt that the offer of incentives to "ease" the stresses of relocation ameliorated the problem. It is their general impression that tenants did not have anything to complain about given financial and other incentives. While some people expressed genuine concern for the welfare of the tenants, the majority view is one which rejects the tenants' fundamental right to housing. The tenants were effectively treated as cattle.

Third, social pressure to "contribute" to the Olympic Games, in both positive and negative ways, was common in Calgary in 1987 and 1988. Spectacles of such nature are designed to create a euphoria which draws people along, enabling them to feel "part" of the venture. Thousands of volunteers contributed to the Calgary Games by hosting visitors, directing people, cleaning sites, etc., (King, 1991; Holmes, 1992). In a strange way, the evictees were perceived by many people to be "doing their part" for the Games.

Fourth, vacancy rates were relatively high in Calgary in 1987 and 1988. Evicted tenants perceived alternative options when forced to move. If vacancy rates were low, it is safe to speculate that more resistance would have been expressed.

And fifth, tenants in Calgary (and Alberta) have rarely been organized in a collective manner, and organization is important when dealing with such political issues.

4. TORONTO: THE BID FOR THE 1996 SUMMER OLYMPICS

Although Toronto was not awarded the 1996 Summer Olympics, housing issues (including the possibility of forced evictions) were key community concerns in public deliberations over the bid. As such, the case is worth briefly examining in that it provides insights for other communities seeking to address such matters.

4.1 The Toronto Context

Toronto is Canada's largest city. With over 3.5 million people, Toronto has a long history of being on the leading edge of economic and cultural transformations in the Canadian context. The city is Canada's main destination point for immigrants from around the world, the centre of economic power, and home to many of the country's cultural and media intelligentsia.

For much of the twentieth century, Toronto was Canada's manufacturing powerhouse. A majority of the wage labour force worked in factories, steel mills, and garment production sweat shops. However, over the last couple of decades, the city has been hit by two major recessions, and suffered the loss of much of its manufacturing base (Lemon, 1991). The quaternary sector (including producer services such as accounting and banking) has grown at an incredible rate, though not enough to offset the blue-collar job losses (City of Toronto Planning and Development Department, 1991). Concurrent growth in the low paying service sector has effectively transformed Toronto into a

city of extremes with respect to wealth, lifestyle, and housing choice. Housing costs are amongst the highest in Canada, and the numbers of homeless had grown to over 25,000, with 80,000 depending on food banks, and 200,000 living in "substandard" housing (Macintosh and Whitson, 1992, p. 33; Borowy, 1992). Large tracts of former industrial and waterfront land have become available for redevelopment, and pressures exist to transform these inner-city sites into new commercial and residential communities in order to satisfy demand for office and residential uses, though there is considerable debate about the composition of these projects (Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront, 1989; Desfor, 1990; Beazley, 1991). The Olympic bid included plans to use many of these sites for various facilities.

4.2 The Toronto Bid for the 1996 Summer Olympics

In 1984, Los Angeles hosted the Summer Olympic Games. In April 1985, the president of the Los Angeles Games organizing committee, Peter Ueberroth, came to Toronto and gave a speech about the benefits associated with hosting such an event. Paul Henderson, self-made millionaire (plumbing) and former Olympic athlete (sailing) was present at that speech, and it renewed a dream he had had since the 1960s of bringing such an international spectacle to Canada's largest city (Palomba, 1990). Henderson collaborated with several corporate colleagues in the marketing and communications industries and they quickly formed the Toronto/Ontario Olympic Council (TOOC) (Dale, 1987). In 1985, the City of Toronto appointed TOOC to prepare a bid for the 1996 Summer Olympic Games. TOOC received financial and in-kind support from the private sector to prepare the bid.

In August 1986, TOOC released *Toronto as Host to the 100th Anniversary Olympics: A Feasibility Study*. This feasibility study formed the basis for subsequent preparatory documents to the final bid document which was approved by City Council in April, 1990. In the feasibility study, and in all subsequent TOOC documents, the main selling points to hosting the Games included:

- The opportunity to improve existing sports facilities.
- The opportunity to develop legacies in the form of new sports facilities, and an ongoing legacy fund.
- The potential economic benefits (direct and induced).
- The international profile the city would gain.
- The opportunity to use the games to spur development in former industrial and waterfront areas of the city.
- The construction jobs which would be generated.

- The opportunity to attract funding from the federal government that would not otherwise be spent.
- The spectacle of the games itself.

In the end, the bid for the 1996 Summer Olympic Games cost approximately \$17 million, with \$5.5 million coming from the provincial and federal governments, and the rest from the private sector (Macintosh and Whitson, 1992, p. 2). The actual budget for the Games was estimated by TOOC to be \$1.053 billion for expenditures, and \$1.063 of revenues, though City of Toronto officials noted that direct and indirect expenditures and revenues would approximate \$2.52 billion and \$2.43 billion leaving a deficit of \$90 million (Coumts and Polanyi, 1990). The Toronto bid counted on \$125 million from the provincial government, and at least \$60 million from federal government (*Ibid.*).

The final bid presented to the IOC had the events staged at a number of facilities throughout the metropolitan region, though many of the high-profile facilities were to be in the City of Toronto itself. The recently constructed Skydome, a domed stadium in the inner city, was to be the site of the opening ceremonies, and many of the track and field competitions. The story behind the Skydome is a lengthy one itself, though it is worth noting that it was originally projected to cost approximately \$130 million, and ended up costing over \$580 million, leaving the provincial taxpayers responsible for some \$440 million (Allen, November 15, 1991). Such debacles are increasingly common in North America, as cities become infatuated with monumentality, "world classism" and intercity competitiveness.

The central waterfront and railway lands were to be used if the Games came to Toronto. The Athletes Village was to be constructed directly west of the Skydome, and over 3,200 new units were to be built. Afterwards, the *Toronto Olympic Commitment* (see section 4.3.2 for a discussion of the origins of this agreement) directed these units to be 100 percent "affordable" and 60 percent social housing, with a provincial definition of affordable being used. In the Ataratri area of the city, the media village of 2,500 new units were to be constructed. Ataratri units were also to be used as "affordable" housing following the operation of the Games. It is important to note, however, that the Ataratri redevelopment plans were shelved in 1992 because of excessive clean-up costs due to the toxicity of the soils of this former industrial area (McInnes, 1992).

Non-housing legacies of the Olympics were to include a \$125 million Olympic stadium, a \$60 million aquatic centre, a \$20 million rowing course, \$8 million velodrome, \$145 million upgrading to various facilities, and \$257 million of other sports facilities scattered throughout the greater Toronto area (Coumts and Polanyi, 1990).

Before we examine how specific housing issues (including the potential for eviction) were incorporated into the Olympic bid, it is important to note one background detail.

Between August 1986 and 1990, when the final bid document was approved by the City of Toronto for presentation to the International Olympic Committee (IOC), some significant changes took place with respect to the composition of Toronto City Council. Following city elections in November 1988 a larger number of "moderate reformers" and New Democratic Party members (social democrats) were elected, as opposed to "conservatives." These changes affected how housing issues were dealt with, following the election more emphasis was placed on attempts to leverage affordable housing out of the Games bid, facilitate public participation processes, and to address potential social impacts such as evictions.

4.3 Olympic Housing Concerns and Community Action in Toronto

4.3.1 Housing Rights and the Legal Framework in Toronto, Ontario

As in the previous two cases, regulations affecting the rights and obligations of tenants and landlords fall under provincial jurisdiction. While there is no need to go into the intricacies of Ontario's complex landlord and tenant law, it is important to note that Ontario has Canada's most protective (from the perspective of the tenant) laws in Canada. Relations between landlord and tenant are affected by three Acts: the *Landlord and Tenant Act*; the *Rental Housing Protection Act*; and the *Residential Rent Regulation Act*. In very general terms, tenants are protected by law from discrimination (e.g., race), exorbitant rent increases, and arbitrary eviction. Rooming house tenants, boarders and lodgers are theoretically protected as well. Moreover, local government has traditionally been more proactive in Ontario with respect to the creation of some laws which augment or contribute to provincial housing law. However, it should be noted that there are many gaps and inadequacies in the key provincial and municipal laws (Federation of Metro Tenants' Association, 1990). Protection also depends upon the forcefulness with which the government implements its laws, as well as the degree of knowledge which each tenant has of his/her rights under the law.

4.3.2 The Incorporation of Housing and Eviction Concerns into the Bid Process

As briefly noted in section 4.2, housing issues were key components of the Toronto bid for the 1996 Summer Olympics. The bid was designed to leave some permanent housing legacies, although it

should be noted that the final plans fell far short of community demands. This section describes and analyses how housing issues (the potential for evictions in particular) were incorporated into the bid process

The potential for Olympic-related evictions in Toronto was a topic of focus from the start of the bid process, although there were sharp differences over the potential for *actual* impacts. In its 1986 feasibility study titled *Toronto as Host to the 100th Anniversary Olympics*, TOOC suggested "residential displacement is not a likelihood in Toronto" because of the "increased awareness" of the issue after the Expo '86 eviction crisis, and because "Toronto has a highly-developed and growing accommodation base, and the short term influx of tourists to participate in the Olympic festivities would not provide a sufficient profit potential to encourage displacement. Public awareness of this potential problem should result in the articulation of a public policy on this issue" (p. V-11).

It was not until late 1988 and early 1989 that the issue of forced evictions received a surge of attention. The reasons for this are threefold. First, during the time of bid preparations, Toronto was experiencing its worst affordable housing crisis in history. Moreover, this crisis peaked at approximately the same time (1989-1990) that key bid components were being decided upon. Local citizens and most politicians from a variety of political perspectives began to worry about the potential for the Games to exacerbate these trends. Housing, tenants' and legal aid organizations such as the Federation of Metro Tenants' Associations, or Metro Tenants' Legal Services, and community organizations such as Parkdale Tenants Association became very worried about the potential for negative social impacts such as evictions. Second, local community groups and some civic politicians were becoming impatient with the perceived "closed shop" mentality of TOOC organizers. Ironically, this frustration spurred them into action. And third, the Bread Not Circuses Coalition (BNCC) formed in February 1989. A diverse variety of organizations associated with the anti-poverty, women's, labour, arts, and social services movement came together to oppose "mega-project mania in Toronto." BNCC's main point is that "we believe that the first priority should be on the real needs of people — affordable housing, a decent income, good jobs, child care, an accessible city, clean and safe neighbourhoods, affordable recreation and popular culture" (Bread Not Circuses Coalition, 1990). This organization became very active in a high-profile manner, and forced TOOC and various levels of government to address a wide array of issues including housing and eviction issues which in turn consumed "unexpected resources" (P. Henderson, personal communication).

Between the summer of 1989 and April 1990 (when the bid document received final approval by the City for submission to the IOC), a frantic flurry of lobbying, research, coalition building, protest, and media coverage occurred as community groups, local government, and politicians all became

involved in deliberation over the issue. In very general terms, the most important activities in this period, from the perspective of this research project, are noted below.

The City of Toronto

- The City of Toronto set up a Committee of Department Heads Olympic Task Force because City Council had felt excluded from much of the bid preparation process, and they wanted to ensure that City goals were incorporated into the final bid document. The head of the Task Force was appointed to TOOC as well in order to facilitate greater City involvement. The Task Force was to address a wide range of issues including finance, environmental impacts, public involvement processes, and housing impacts (including the potential for evictions).
- The Task Force, in conjunction with civic politicians, derived *The Toronto Olympic Commitment*. This document, approved in September 1989, is a set of principles

that embodies the spirit of the Olympic movement...The Toronto Olympic Commitment was adopted by Toronto City Council to ensure that if Toronto were awarded the Games, we would plan and stage an equitable, affordable Olympics that would leave a lasting legacy for all Canadians.

There were five main categories of commitments: 1) Social Equity; 2) Environment; 3) Financial Guarantees; 4) A Healthy Olympics; 5) Jobs and the Olympics. Housing concerns fell under the Social Equity category and a commitment was made to ensure that existing residents were not displaced because of visitors to the Games (a copy of the commitment is displayed in Appendix A). The *Toronto Olympic Commitment* was developed after pressure was exerted on City Council by some local political and community leaders who recognized the potential for significant negative impacts. In contrast TOOC, and Paul Henderson in particular, felt that this commitment was one more needless "political" "unnecessary and troublesome" interjection into the efficient preparation of the Olympic bid (P. Henderson, personal communication; P. Berck, personal communication). It should also be noted that the *Toronto Olympic Commitment* is a policy document, and as is the case with most policy documents, implementation of each policy was/would be carried out with varying degrees of "success."

Following the *Toronto Olympic Commitment*, a wide variety of City activities occurred.

- The City of Toronto Housing and Properties Department hired a consultant to conduct research on the housing impacts of hallmark events in other cities. The consultant reported back with findings and recommendations for the City Task Force. These recommendations were used to

develop a "tenant protection and tourist accommodation strategy." The tenant protection component of the plan dealt with: a) rooming and boarding houses; b) private rental accommodation; c) low-income residents in hotels; and d) emergency housing. The consultant shared information with the person conducting a similar study for the Federation of Metro Tenants' Associations (see below). After both studies came out in January 1990, the City's plans were improved with the input of the FMTA study and the comments of various interested parties. An "affordable housing group" of bureaucrats from various City departments was formed as well. In March 1990, work on the City's tenant protection and tourist accommodation plan was put on hold until the September when the final decision of the IOC was made.

- A consultant was hired to design a public involvement process so that a wide range of issues could be addressed. Public meetings were held on housing issues, and the potential for evictions were spoken about by community representatives.
- A consultant prepared a preliminary social impact assessment report which included a section on potential housing impacts
- The City approved the provision of \$110,000 of "intervenor funding" to allow groups to "participate more meaningfully in the discussion and evaluation of the bid, and that the Committee of Heads Olympic Task Force report on the implementation of this commitment" (City of Toronto, Committee of Department Heads Olympic Task Force, 1989). A wide variety of non-profit organizations applied for funding from the City in order to finance a short-term research project on various areas of concern, such as the environment, multicultural issues, and housing. Twenty groups applied for funding, and eight were approved, including two "housing" organizations—The Federation of Metro Tenants' Associations, and the Supportive Housing Coalition. A third group (Women Plan Toronto) addressed housing as well as one component of a multi-component report written from the perspective of "women." Ironically, it was active community lobbying, most notably from the BNCC, which led to City support for intervenor funding. However, BNCC's proposal was not funded as the City decided the money should only be allocated to groups who were committed to *improving* the bid, not halting it.
- Various City politicians (including the Mayor) and senior government officials worked to ensure that the housing units which were to be constructed for the Athletes Village, and the Media Village would be retained as "affordable housing" following the Games. This aim was designed to meet housing needs, while convincing/pressuring people with power to support the Olympic bid—basically "what is your social price to support the Games?" (M. Melling, personal communication; T. Greer, personal communication). In the end, the final housing component

was reached after hundreds of hours of negotiation, lobbying, and last minute ultimatums between politicians and officials from all levels of government, TOOC officials, crown corporations, housing advocates and others. The final bid was supposed to result in 1000 "additional" provincial housing units at a cost of \$150 million, creating in all 5,700 units in 6 years (2,500 units on the Ataratiri lands, and 3,200 units on the "Railway lands.") This plan was to act as a catalyst or "fast tracking" mechanism, which would enable housing units to be built earlier than they might be otherwise. However, it was riddled with weaknesses, including the fact that the Railway lands were owned by a crown corporation (CN) and negotiations were not finalized. It was also unclear where *all* the funds would come from to construct the units, buy the land, and a plan to clean up the environmental contaminants on the Ataratiri lands was not in place.

The "Community"

A variety of housing, tenant, and neighbourhood organizations became involved in an array of activities related to housing issues including research, lobbying, decision-making, and consultation with other community organizations and groups like BNCC. Throughout this period, the groups mulled over and fluctuated in terms of what their response should be to the Olympic bid. Some thought the Games could be leveraged to extract long-term positive benefits in terms of affordable housing. Others thought the Games' costs outweighed its potential benefits. For example, the Federation of Metro Tenants' Associations (an association of tenants' associations throughout the metropolitan Toronto area), met frequently to debate the bid and their stance on it, eventually supporting the bid, provided a range of protective actions for tenants were carried. In Parkdale, a lower income inner-city community (much like Vancouver's Downtown Eastside) composed of a high proportion of tenants, and people living in rooming houses, opposition to the bid was consistently expressed. The Parkdale Tenants' Association and Parkdale Community Legal Services felt the Games would only exacerbate already inadequate housing conditions.

- Some of the community groups applied for and were awarded the intervenor funding noted above in order to conduct research on the potential impacts of the Games. The Federation of Metro Tenants' Associations produced a detailed 46 page report (*The 1996 Olympic Bid Proposal and Tenant Protection*) outlining every possible negative impact the Games might have on tenants. The author, Jeff Clark, examined the experiences of other cities (including Vancouver, Calgary and Seoul) with hallmark events. Twenty-six recommendations developed for various levels of government regarding issues including enforcement, public education, political leadership, landlord and tenant law, resources, relocation, etc. They also addressed the potential long-term impacts of the Games on housing and neighbourhoods, in terms of the

increased potential for gentrification, the need for long-term solutions to the affordable housing problem, and so on. The Supportive Housing Coalition (SHC), composed of eight non-profit housing organizations, conducted a detailed study as well, as did Women Plan Toronto (WPT). Following release of the "intervenor reports" as they came to be known, groups such as FMTA met with City of Toronto housing planners in order to clarify their concerns regarding the potential impacts of the Games, and to outline solutions for these concerns should Toronto win the bid. FMTA, SHC and WPT also lobbied civic politicians to act on the findings of their report.

- *BNCC* developed a multi-pronged approach to "set the agenda," stop the "corporate mega-projects" and force TOOC, various levels of government, and the general public to consider the negative consequences of sponsoring the Games. BNCC sought to transform the public discourse over the hallmark event bid so that it included serious focus on social issues, rather than the narrowly defined corporate agenda. A "community strategy" and a "political strategy" were developed in order to act at a variety of levels (Shapcott, 1991). Activities varied over time, and included: in-depth *research* and documentation of various aspects of the bid process, the impacts of hallmark events in other cities, the bid document, and the perceived "narrowness and anti-democratic" attitude of TOOC organizers; *lobbying* of politicians, government officials, TOOC officials, the media, IOC members; coalition building with community groups in other bidding cities, for example Melbourne, and within Toronto; and public protests.

BNCC's budget was under \$20,000 (as opposed to approximately \$17 million for TOOC), and they were forced to rely upon volunteer time and resources. Women played a significant role in the formulation and implementation of BNCC's strategy.

The Decision

After the climax of a "period of frenzied lobbying" in early April 1990, Toronto City Council voted 12-4 on April 12 in favour of approving the bid to the IOC (M. Melling, personal communication). The period between April and September was relatively uneventful, as most interested parties awaited the decision by the IOC. TOOC, of course, was lobbying IOC voting members during this period. BNCC was active as well, and they devoted their attention and resources in this period to lobbying IOC members to turn the Toronto bid down.

In September 1990, IOC Board members met in Tokyo to make the decision about which city would host the 1996 Summer Olympic Games. TOOC and senior City of Toronto officials and politicians were in Tokyo, as were two members of BNCC. The BNCC members conducted some last minute lobbying and protests in order to highlight their opposition to the Games coming to Toronto.

In the end, the IOC chose Atlanta as host for the Games. Subsequent press coverage in Toronto was fairly critical of the BNCC action, and they, along with several local politicians became "scapegoats" for the loss of the Games to Atlanta. Indeed, Paul Henderson, President and Chief Executive Officer of TOOC stated that BNCC opposition was one of the major factors behind the loss of the bid, and he has maintained such criticism of the group to this day. Henderson feels that the group (a "vociferous minority") created the *illusion* of public antagonism to the idea of a Toronto-hosted Games. However, a subsequent analysis of the bid conducted by the Ontario Ministry of Tourism and Recreation (1991) suggests that there were dozens of weaknesses with respect to the Toronto bid process, and with the people representing TOOC. In particular, the report suggests that TOOC did not involve the "community" in meaningful discourse and it noted that "[I]t was virtually unanimous that it is critical to involve the community at large in honest discussion on the bid as early in the process as possible" (p. 10).

4.4 Community Action and Impact: The Critical Factors

Community action on the issue of the potential for Olympic-related evictions was critical to the significant attention (particularly compared to the Calgary and Vancouver cases) devoted to the subject. A diverse range of community-based groups ensured that the subject was addressed by City of Toronto officials and politicians, and TOOC officials, through the wide range of activities described above. This strategic, energetic and continuous pressure, combined with important support from certain empathetic political and bureaucratic actors at the local and provincial levels, led to relatively enlightened policies on the issue. At a deeper contextual level, key forces which led to this situation included the context of an affordable housing crisis with public awareness of housing issues, a history of (again, on a relative basis) general support for tenants rights and the human right to housing, and a history of tenant activism to secure these rights. Simply put, the *capacity* existed *within* the community to force the issue of housing concerns (including forced evictions) onto the bid agenda from a community perspective.

While many differing viewpoints were offered on the ultimate impacts of community action regarding the Olympic bid (and the potential for evictions in particular), it is clear that groups such as BNCC, FMTA and the Parkdale Tenants Association forced the State and TOOC to address social concerns in a more concerted manner than they would have done otherwise. By raising legitimate concerns over social issues such as housing, the community likely caused, or significantly contributed to:

- Significant public discourse over the social costs of staging hallmark events in Toronto.
- The creation and adoption of the *City of Toronto Olympic Commitment*.
- Greater awareness of weaknesses within existing landlord and tenant legislation.
- Future awareness of the importance to honestly involve the community in deliberations over major plans in Toronto which affect people.




Figure 9. The Cover of a "Bread Not Circuses" Coalition Report

5. CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Housing Rights in the Face of the Hallmark Event?

In these three cases, and as recognized in a growing literature (e.g., Hall, 1992), the hallmark event acts as a spotlight, signifying the nature of politics and economics in the contemporary urban (re)development processes. Currently in vogue, the hallmark event is being used as a mechanism to restructure the city, creating, amongst other things, a strong potential for massive numbers of forced evictions. These negative social impacts negate the principle of the right to housing. Housing rights are really one component of a much larger right: the right to the city. These events are making the right to the city even *less* accessible than in "regular" development circumstances, given a variety of features. These features, outlined below, must be addressed by community groups in their struggles.

- 1) Hallmark events can lever major quantities of senior government and private capital that might not otherwise come to a city and region. The promise of substantial legacies in the form of stadiums, roadways, new recreational facilities and new housing are difficult to evaluate given the time compression of a hallmark event bid process. This is a similar factor affecting the debate over sports franchises and stadium construction.
- 2) Because the hallmark event has a national and international imagery component to it, local citizens, politicians and business leaders feel that their "name and reputation" is "on the line." Consequently, they are willing to accommodate heavy demands, and to initiate their own actions which they would not do in a non-hallmark context. For example, debt will be accumulated via the fast-tracking of major projects, "unsightly scenes" (from the aesthetic standards of international travellers and business people) such as "slums" will be eliminated or hidden from view, and previous disagreements over approach or policies will be resolved or delayed until the event has finished. However, for community groups, and tenant activists, it is possible to use this concern with image to force issues into the public eye via the media. In this manner, the issue may possibly be resolved quickly in order to quell fears of a negative image or "black eye."
- 3) The sport or exhibition nature of a hallmark event can pull together disparate interests and present the illusion of consensus (Macintosh and Whitson, 1992). It is common to see diverse ideological parties collaborate because it is simply required when a major event must be planned, developed and operated in a compressed time scale. The organizers of the event (usually corporate and political elites) recognize this quality, and use it to propel their goals for urban development planning where it is difficult to openly evaluate these plans because of time constraints. Diversity and disagreement cannot help but be masked in such circumstances, and it

takes extraordinary skill, planning and power on behalf of anyone resisting or seeking fundamental changes in a planned event (post-bid).

- 4) The sites chosen for hallmark events is often in the inner city because of the long-term redevelopment goals for the area by event sponsors. Perceived by sponsors as needing "revitalization" because of "poor" housing conditions, low land values, and low numbers of resident middle class people residing in the area, such plans often create negative social impacts for existing residents. These impacts occur because of the generally weak political power of the residents.
- 5) The large scale and multi-year nature of the hallmark event requires the long-term involvement of hundreds of governmental agencies, businesses, and non-profit organizations, and the expenditure of hundreds of millions to billions of dollars. Moreover, the impacts of hallmark events may vary in nature and scale, and occur over several years beginning with the bid process. Consequently, it becomes extremely difficult for community groups to address issues of concern such as potential housing impacts and evictions. The case studies suggest that community groups must be extremely well organized, and expend considerable resources to have any significant impact. Where resources are limited (e.g., BNCC had a limited budget of only \$20,000) strategic planning, coalition building and task sharing is requisite to any success. It is very important to act as quickly as possible when the bid preparation phase is underway. If a bid is approved, time effectively collapses, and the pace of event planning quickens, consuming resources at a rapid pace.

Housing impacts, including forced evictions, should be viewed as an expected result of this form of restructuring as it is not centred around "people in place" development (Boothroyd and Knight, forthcoming). Rather, the dominant state and private sector goals are to bring *new* people, *new* facilities, and *new* money to cities at a rapid pace, and this goal is rarely evaluated in an open democratic manner. Such development plans need to be critically examined in a time frame that permits all potentially affected groups to participate on an equitable basis.

5.2 Interpretation

That evictions are occurring in a wealthy and "democratic" country such as Canada may be a surprise to some readers in countries facing more severe housing problems. Indeed, some may feel that, on a relative basis, the problems faced in the Canadian cases are insignificant. However, it should be noted that hundreds to thousands of evictions occur across Canada every day, that these primarily take place in individual cases, and tenants usually have no feasible option but to accept the

action and deal with the negative consequences. Indirect economic eviction occurs as well, as rental housing becomes too expensive to rent, and people are forced to move. The Canadian case is interesting in that it highlights the fact that the act of eviction is connected to underlying economic, political and social structures and mechanisms. Forced evictions can occur in any country, regardless of national wealth, degree of political "democracy," or amount of "housing rights" rhetoric if the deeper structures and mechanisms force people to live in precarious conditions. In Canada, the only secure way to achieve the right to housing is to *buy* it, providing you have access to the capital! Yet, all Canadians are supposed to enjoy the human right to housing. Canada adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with its specific reference to housing rights, and the concept is part of our 1973 *National Housing Act*. Moreover, Canada has signed other international declarations, covenants and conventions recognizing housing rights (Hulchanski, 1989). As noted in all of the case studies, however, there is a critical gap between proclaiming the right to housing, and actually attempting to implement the right to housing.

On a final optimistic note, the Toronto case suggests that the gap between housing rights proclamation and implementation can be narrowed in circumstances. The critical *prerequisite* for any action to occur on housing rights issues is the presence of an organized, strategic and resourceful coalition of community-based groups that have the *capacity* to analyze complex situations, act forcefully at a variety of levels, and use diverse strategies in order to take advantage of key "openings" when seeking to achieve their goals. This is particularly true when dealing with issues surrounding the planning of the hallmark event in a city; a spectacle which compounds and amplifies existing conditions, for better and for worse.

APPENDIX A

THE TORONTO OLYMPIC COMMITMENT

Toronto is honoured to submit our Bid to host the 1996 Summer Olympic Games. Our bid has been framed by the Toronto Olympic Commitment, a set of principles that embodies the spirit of the Olympic Movement. The Toronto Olympic Commitment was adopted by Toronto City Council to ensure that if Toronto were awarded the Games, we would *plan and stage* an equitable, affordable Olympics that would leave a lasting legacy for all Canadians.

We believe in the Toronto Olympic Commitment's goal of sharing an equitable and affordable Olympics with Canadians- with the world. We are proud to present this Commitment to you.

In developing Toronto's Olympic Bid, City Council's objective will be to achieve the following:

1. SOCIAL EQUITY

A. Housing

- Olympic housing that will be 100% affordable and 60% social housing after the Games are complete. "Affordable" in this instance follows the provincial definition: housing which has a market price or rent that would be affordable to households of low and moderate income. Households of low and moderate income are defined as households within the lowest 60% of the income distribution for the housing region - in Metro, that means a household income to a maximum of \$55, 800 a year.
- Olympic housing that will produce significantly more affordable and social housing than would have previously been expected or committed to be produced.
- A plan to ensure that existing residents are not displaced because of visitors to the Games.

B. Affordable Recreation

The Bid will include a detailed list of facilities and improvement in the City and elsewhere in the region which will provide affordable recreation.

C. Affordable Olympics

The Bid will include a plan to ensure that Torontonians of lesser means, including children, will be able to afford to attend events, from preliminaries to finals.

D. Social Impact Assessment

The Olympic Bid will include a full Social Impact Assessment process. This process involves meeting with representatives of citizens groups, social agencies and different levels of government, to assess the impact of staging the Olympics on a wide range of people

including: ethnocultural groups; people with disabilities; the homeless; young people; the sporting community; the native community; people on fixed incomes; and the business community. This assessment will also look at how the Olympics could affect housing, transportation, community and social services, the environment and the waterfront, as well as assessing the labour and economic impact and the question of security and public protection.

E. Sexual Equality

City Council will:

- Work to achieve parity between men and women on all Olympic Organising Committee structures.
- Work to ensure that sporting venues and training centres will have day-care facilities.
- Use the City's influence in planning sports and events selection to address the imbalance of the sexes in the Games.

F. Equal Opportunity

Council will work to ensure that equal opportunity principles are established and implemented with respect to all aspects of the Olympic Games.

G. Accessible Olympics

In co-ordination with all planning bodies, the Olympic plan must include a comprehensive programme to ensure integration and access to persons with disabilities.

2. ENVIRONMENT

- A. No exemptions for full Environmental Assessment processes, where applicable, be sought.
- B. The Olympic plan must include a comprehensive programme that will ensure that air quality in the City will not be negatively affected.
- C. The Olympic plan must include a comprehensive programme that will ensure that water quality in the City will be measurably improved in areas where Olympic events are being staged.
- D. The Olympic plan must include a comprehensive programme of waste management, encompassing the minimisation of waste generation, the recycling of appropriate materials and the safe, efficient collection and disposal of those wastes which cannot otherwise be eliminated.

3. FINANCIAL GUARANTEES

- A. Firm financial commitments from the Federal and Provincial governments, other municipal governments and the private sector should be obtained no later than April, 1990

- B. Council should endeavour to ensure that all public funds, with the exception of those related to housing, other facilities, and infrastructures which would have otherwise been constructed, are recovered.
- C. All costs of the Games must be fully and publicly accounted for.
- D. Council should develop a strategy to have corporate sponsors share the financial risk of the Games.
- E. Council will work to ensure that the Olympic facilities are innovative and functional rather than luxurious and extravagant.

4. A HEALTHY OLYMPICS

- A. Council will not accept sponsorships from corporations which produce, sell, or are otherwise involved in promoting unhealthy activities, such as tobacco use.
- B. Council commits itself to a no drugs Olympics and will aggressively pursue strategies to ensure that this goal is achieved.

5. JOBS AND THE OLYMPICS

- A. Council will respect its current policy on the rezoning and redesignation of industrial land with respect to all aspects of the Games.
- B. Council will develop a Fair Wage Policy for all Olympic workers.
- C. Council will maximise the number of unionised jobs on all matters pertaining to the Olympics.
- D. Council will ensure that the Organising Committee for the Olympic Games adopts the purchasing policies of the City of Toronto, which include a Fair Wage Policy in its mandate.

Source: Olds. 1992. Annex A

APPENDIX B
RESOURCE PEOPLE

Calgary

CLOUSE, JACK. City of Calgary.

COLLIN, NEIL. Manager, Housing Services, Southern Alberta Institute of Technology.

FORD, ROBIN. Deputy Minister of Labour, and former Deputy Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs.

FRASER, PETER. Director of Ancillary Services, University of Calgary.

GREY, MELVA. Sales and Leasing for Riverside Towers.

HOLMES, BOB. Commissioner of Planning and Community Services, City of Calgary.

LAURIDSEN, HARTVIG. Manager, Information Centre, City of Calgary.

LUFT, DEBBIE. Supervisor, Calgary Landlord and Tenant Advisory Service.

MARTIN, DON. Columnist, Calgary Herald Newspaper.

MOURITSON, DAVID. Calgary Association of Renters.

PAULS, RICHARD. Director of Research and Market Analysis, Calgary Economic Development Authority.

REID, LINDA D. Supervisor, Information Centre, Planning Services Division, City of Calgary.

SANDRIN-LITT, RON. Accomodation Service Manager, OCO '88.

WADE, TIM. Executive Assistant to MLA Elaine McCoy, former Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs.

Toronto

BERCK, PHYLLIS. Department of Parks and Recreation, City of Toronto.

BOROWY, JAN. Bread Not Circuses Coalition.

BOURNE, LARRY. Professor, Department of Geography, University of Toronto.

Toronto (cont.)

- BROOK, CALVIN. Director, Urban Design and Planning, Brisbin Brook Beynon Architects.
- BURNS, DANIEL. Deputy Minister, Ontario Ministry of Housing.
- GREENAWAY, ANN-MARIE. Housing Consultant.
- HENDERSON, PAUL. President, Toronto/Ontario Olympic Council (TOOC).
- GREER, TOM. Director, City of Toronto Management Services Department. Former Executive Assistant to Mayor Art Eggleton.
- MELLING, MICHAEL. Executive Director, HOUSEXCO; Chair, Federation of Metro Tenants' Associations
- LAYTON, JACK. Councillor, City of Toronto.
- MCCABE, PENNY. Tenants' Organizer, Federation of Metro Tenants' Associations.
- MILGROM, RICHARD. Designer and Programming Consultant.
- SHAPCOTT, MICHAEL. Bread Not Circuses Coalition.
- POESIAT, BART. Community Legal Worker, Parkdale Community Legal Services.
- WATSON, LESLIE. Manager, Policy and Research, City of Toronto Housing Department.
- WAXMAN, MARIE-ELIZABETH. Railway Lands Action Coalition.
- WOO, LESLIE. Department of Parks and Recreation, City of Toronto

Vancouver

- BANTLEMAN, LAURENCE. First United Church Social Housing Society.
- BLATHERWICK, DR. JOHN. Chief Medical Health Officer, Vancouver Health Department, City of Vancouver.
- GAGNE, CINDI. Manager, Housing Allocation and Rent Calculation, British Columbia Housing Management Commission.
- GREEN, JIM. Organizer, Downtown Eastside Residents Association (DERA).
- JAMES, SANDRA. Health Planning and Policy Analyst, Vancouver Health Department, City of Vancouver.

Vancouver (contd.)

MADDEN, GEORGE. Vice President, Communications and Marketing, Expo '86.

PURDY, DOUG. Deputy Director, Social Planning Department, City of Vancouver.

SHAYLER, JOHN. Downtown Eastside Residents Association (DERA); Tenants Rights Action Coalition.

STANNARD, LAURA. Downtown Eastside Residents Association.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ANDERSON, R., and E. WACHTEL (eds.), The Expo Story, Madeira Park, B.C., Harbour Publishing, 1986.
- ARTIBISE, A., and G. STELTER (eds.), The Usable Urban Past: Planning and Politics in the Modern Canadian City, Toronto, MacMillan, 1979.
- BEAZLEY, M., "The Railway Lands, Toronto: Local Resistance to Global Change," paper presented at the Joint ACSP and AESOP International Congress, Oxford, U.K., July, 1991.
- BEAZLEY, M., Public Participation in Urban Mega-Project Planning: The Developers, the Planners, and the Community, Doctoral Dissertation, School of Community and Regional Planning, University of British Columbia, 1992.
- BENNETT, W., "Speaking Notes for Premier Bennett," Four Seasons Hotel, Vancouver, January 29, 1980.
- "Bill Won't Take Blame," Vancouver Sun, April 25, 1986, p. 27.
- BLOCK, W., "Evictions: Why All the Fuss," Vancouver Province, March 25, 1986, p. 17.
- BOARD, M., "McCoy Vows to Act on '88 Evictions," Calgary Herald, June 30, 1987, p. B1.
- BOARD, M., "York Hotel Relents, Everyone Can Stay," Calgary Herald, November 17, 1987, p. A1.
- BOOTHROYD, P., and N. KNIGHT, "People in Place Prosperity: A Case Study of Planning Failure," submitted to Canadian Journal of Regional Science, forthcoming.
- BOROWY, J., "Mega-Project Mania: Toronto's Economic Development Strategy," paper presented at the Canadian Association of Geographers Conference, Vancouver, May, 1992.
- BREAD NOT CIRCUSES COALITION, "Stop Playing Games With Toronto," a submission to Toronto City Council Executive Committee, September 18, 1989.
- BREAD NOT CIRCUSES COALITION, Stop Playing Games With Toronto: An Anti-Olympic Peoples Bid Book, Toronto, BNCC, January, 1990.

- CALGARY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Calgary ... Into the 21st Century, Calgary, Calgary Economic Development Authority, 1988.
- CALGARY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Calgary: In Fact a Profile 1990/91, Calgary, Calgary Economic Development Authority, 1990.
- CAMPBELL, C., "The Stampede: Cowtown's Sacred Cow," in C. Reasons (ed.) Stampede City: Power and Politics in the West, Toronto, Between the Lines, 1984.
- CATTANEO, C., "Tenant Committee Finds Few Infractions," Calgary Herald, January 20, 1988.
- CITY OF CALGARY, The City of Calgary XV Olympic Winter Games Final Report, Calgary, City of Calgary, Olympic Liaison, 1988.
- CITY OF CALGARY PLANNING DEPARTMENT, Victoria Park East Design Brief, Calgary, City of Calgary, 1977.
- CITY OF CALGARY PLANNING DEPARTMENT, Preliminary Impact Study: Proposed Coliseum and Stampede Expansion, Calgary, City of Calgary, 1980.
- CITY OF TORONTO, COMMITTEE OF DEPARTMENT HEADS OLYMPIC TASK FORCE, "Report on Intervenor Funding," October 11, 1989.
- CITY OF TORONTO PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, Cityplan '91 Proposals Report, Toronto, City of Toronto, 1991.
- CITY OF TORONTO AND TORONTO/ONTARIO OLYMPIC COUNCIL, Toronto's Proposal to Host the Games of the XXVth Olympiad, Toronto, City of Toronto and Canadian Olympic Association, 1990.
- COONEY, R., "Student Tenants Seek Safeguards in '88," Calgary Herald, September 22, 1986, p. B1.
- COONEY, R., "88 Deal Sought for 'Evicted' Students," Calgary Herald, October 22, 1986, p. B1.
- COUTTS, J., and M. POLANYI, "Bidding for the Spectacular," Globe and Mail, June 9, 1990.
- DALE, S., "Flame and Misfortune: Should We Attempt to Host the 1996 Olympic Games? No Way!" Toronto Life, December, 1987, pp. 37-86.

DAVIS, H.C., and T. HUTTON, Marketing Vancouver's Producer Services to the Asia Pacific, Vancouver, UBC School of Community and Regional Planning, 1992.

"Diplomacy at the York," Calgary Herald, editorial, November 17, 1987, p. A4.

DONVILLE, C., and D. HAYNES, "Hotel Tenants Cast Out For Games," Calgary Herald, November 15, 1987, p. A1.

DOWNTOWN EASTSIDE RESIDENT'S ASSOCIATION, Expo '86: Its Legacy to Vancouver's Downtown Eastside, Vancouver, DERA, 1987.

FEDERATION OF METRO TENANTS' ASSOCIATION, The 1996 Olympic Bid Proposal and Tenant Protection, Toronto, FMTA, 1990.

GERECKE, K., "Success in Revitalizing the Inner City—The Story of DERA," City Magazine, Vol. 12, No. 4, Fall, 1991, pp. 11-19

GLAVIN, T., "Economist Backs Busing Evictees," Vancouver Sun, April 23, 1986.

GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, The Expo '86 General Report, Ottawa, Department of External Affairs, 1986.

GRAY, J., A Brand of Its Own: The 100 Year History of the Calgary Exhibition and Stampede, Saskatoon, Western Producer Prairie Books, 1985.

HALL, C.M., Hallmark Events: The Impacts, Management, and Planning of Event Tourism, New York, Belhaven Press, 1992.

HARCOURT, M., "Housing Plan: Expo Offers Hope for Slum-dwellers," Vancouver Weekly Post, February 29, 1984a.

HARCOURT, M., "Housing for Expo," Vancouver Mid-Town Mount Pleasant Revue, March 30, 1984b.

HILLER, H., "The Urban Impact of the 1988 Winter Olympics: Calgary, Canada," paper presented at the Conference on People and Physical Environment Research, Centre for Urban Research, University of Western Australia, Perth, 1987.

- HILLER, H., "Impact and Image: The Convergence of Urban Factors in Preparing for the 1988 Calgary Winter Olympics," in G. Syme, et. al. The Planning and Evaluation of Hallmark Events, Brookfield, USA, Avenbury, 1989.
- HILLER, H., "The Urban Transformation of a Landmark Event: The 1988 Calgary Winter Olympics," Urban Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 26, No.1, September, 1990, pp. 118-137.
- HOLMES, B., "The Calgary Olympic Winter Games Experience," paper presented at the PACOM Conference, Calgary, July 21, 1992.
- HULCHANSKI, J.D., "Do All Canadians Have a Right to Housing," Canadian Housing, Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring, 1989, pp. 5-10.
- HULCHANSKI, J.D., Low Rent Housing in Vancouver's Central Area: Policy and Program Options, Vancouver, UBC Centre for Human Settlements, 1989.
- HULCHANSKI, J.D., M. EBERLE, K. OLDS, and D. STEWART, Solutions to Homelessness: Vancouver Case Studies, Vancouver, UBC Centre for Human Settlements, 1991.
- HUME, M., "Turned Out: They Built Canada. Now They're Uprooted," Vancouver Sun, March 8, 1986, p. A10.
- KELLY, R., Pattison: Portrait of a Capitalist Superstar, Vancouver, New Star Books, 1986.
- "Kempf Hits Reluctance of 'So-called Evictees'," Vancouver Sun, May 14, 1986, p. A12.
- KING, F., "Calgary's Day in the Olympic Sun," lecture, Urban Land Institute Atlanta District Council Meetings, Atlanta, Georgia, November 9, 1991.
- LAMB, M., "OCO Says York Hotel Evictions Unnecessary," Calgary Herald, November 16, 1987, p. A2.
- LEMON, J., "Toronto," Cities, Vol. 8, No. 4, November, 1991, pp. 258-266.
- LEY, D., "Liberal Ideology and the Postindustrial City," Annals, Association of American Geographers, Vol. 70, 1980, pp. 238-258.
- LEY, D., and K. OLDS, "Landscape as Spectacle: World's Fairs and the Culture of Heroic Consumption," Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, Vol 6, No. 2, 1988, pp. 191-212.

- LEY, D., and S. HASSON, *Neighbourhood Organizations and the Welfare State*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1994.
- LEY, D., and K. OLDS, "Single Room Occupancy Housing in Vancouver: Trends and Policies," forthcoming.
- LYOTIER, K. and G. SHUTER, *Housing Needs and Development Potential in Downtown Eastside Vancouver*, Vancouver, First United Church Social Housing Society, 1982.
- MACINTOSH, D., and D. WHITSON, "Economic, Political, and Social Dimensions of Major Games Bids in Canada: An Overview," unpublished draft paper, 1992.
- Macleans*, Vol. 101, No. 4, February 1988.
- MARTIN, D., "Point McKay Owners, Residents Looking at an Olympic Bonanza," *Calgary Herald*, March 19, 1987, p. B1.
- MARTIN, D., "Klein Claims Olympic Evictions 'a Black Eye,'" *Calgary Herald*, June 19, 1987, p. B1.
- MARTIN, D., "Juggled Tenants OK Compensation," *Calgary Herald*, September 17, 1987, p. B1.
- MASON, G., "Evictions Distorted, Kempf Says," *Vancouver Sun*, April 18, 1986, p. A10.
- MATE, S., "Students Leaving Notes for Olympic Athletes," *Calgary Herald*, January 11, 1988, p. B1.
- MCINNES, C., "The Untimely Death of Ataratiri," *Canadian Housing*, Vol. 9, Nos. 1-2, Summer, 1992, pp. 14-15.
- MINOVITZ, E., "Eviction Protection on Hold as Council Hits Deadlock," Vancouver *EastEnder*, August 15, 1985.
- MITCHELL, A., "Tenants Must Move for '88 sponsors," *Calgary Herald*, June 19, 1987, p. A1,A2.
- OLDS, K., *Planning for the Housing Impacts of a Hallmark Event: A Case Study of Expo '86*, Masters Thesis, School of Community and Regional Planning, University of British Columbia, 1988.

- ONTARIO MINISTRY OF TOURISM AND RECREATION, An Analysis and Report on the Toronto Ontario Bid for the 1996 Summer Olympic Games, Toronto, Government of Ontario, 1991.
- PALOMBA, L., "Toronto's Long, Long Road to the Olympics," Globe and Mail, September 7, 1990, p. C1
- RANKIN, H., "Big Projects Hurt Downtown Eastside," Vancouver Western News, June 10, 1981, p. 5.
- REASONS, C. (ed.), Stampede City: Power and Politics in the West, Toronto, Between the Lines, 1984.
- REID, B., "The Death of an Inner City Community: Victoria Park and Its Demise in the Face of Power," City Magazine, Vol. 12, No. 4, Fall, 1991, pp. 5-6.
- REID, B., "The Death of Victoria Park Neighbourhood, the State of Urban Reform, and the Battle of Mythologies in Calgary," City Magazine, Vol. 13, No. 1, Winter, 1991/1992, pp. 36-42.
- RITCHIE, J.R.B., "Assessing the Impact of Hallmark Events: Conceptual and Research Issues," Journal of Travel Research, 23 (1), 1984, pp. 2-11.
- SAVE THE DOWNTOWN EASTSIDE COMMITTEE, "The Downtown Eastside: A Neighborhood Worth Saving," Vancouver, mimeograph, 1982.
- SCOTT, J., "Mountains, Fun in the Sun and Artificial Intelligence: Calgary's Economic Development Strategy," City Magazine, Vol. 13, No 2, Spring, 1992, pp. 6-8.
- SHAPCOTT, M., "'Bread Not Circuses' Saves the Day," City Magazine, Vol. 12, No. 1, Fall, 1990, pp. 8-9.
- SHAPCOTT, M., "Effective Social Change Through Coalition: The Case of Toronto's Bread Not Circuses Coalition," paper presented at the Learned's, Kingston, Ontario, June, mimeo, 1991.
- SHAYLER, J., "Expo '86: The Social Impact on its Backdoor Neighbourhood," City Magazine, Vol. 8, No. 2, Spring, 1986, pp. 32-35.
- SOCIAL PLANNING DEPARTMENT, CITY OF VANCOUVER, Downtown Lodging Houses and Tenant Profile, Vancouver, Social Planning Department, 1983.

SOCIAL PLANNING DEPARTMENT, CITY OF VANCOUVER, A Housing Program for Expo: Housing Expo Exhibitors and Vancouver Residents, Vancouver, Social Planning Department, 1984.

SOCIAL PLANNING DEPARTMENT, CITY OF VANCOUVER, Downtown Expo Housing Survey, Vancouver: Social Planning Department, 1985.

SPIRIT OF STAMPEDE, A Brighter Horizon: A Citizens' View of Stampede Expansion, Calgary, Spirit of Stampede, 1992.

"Students Demand Housing Action," Calgary Herald, October 11, 1986, p. B2.

SVOBODA, E., "Angry Tenants Plan Eviction Protests," Calgary Herald, June 22, 1987, p. B2.

TAMAKI, M., Advocacy in Architecture, Masters Thesis, School of Architecture, University of British Columbia, 1991.

TENANTS' RIGHTS COALITION, Legislative Policy, Vancouver, Tenants' Rights Coalition, 1986.

TORONTO/ONTARIO OLYMPIC COUNCIL (TOOC), Toronto as Host to the 100th Anniversary Olympics: A Feasibility Study, prepared for TOOC by Cresap, McCormick and Paget/Barnard Management Consultants, Toronto, 1986.

WARWICK, B., "Tenants Happy to be Staying Put," Calgary Herald, November 17, 1987, p. B1.

XV Winter Olympics Official Report, Calgary, XV Olympic Winter Games Organizing Committee, 1988.

EDITOR'S NOTE

This article is part of a new series of working papers on problems of contemporary planning. The broad purpose of the series is to provide a vehicle for the timely publication of research results in the broadly-defined planning sphere, reflecting the emerging planning research agenda and new frontiers of research activity.

Our policy toward submissions is inclusive, and we are particularly pleased to invite papers in the following areas:

- sustainable development planning, including applications in the urban context, and both conceptual and more operational approaches
- urban restructuring, including socio-economic, physical, spatial, and land-use aspects and implications
- community economic development (CED), both in the Canadian and international contexts
- special problems of resource regions, including both 'advanced' and 'developing' regions
- policy innovation, introduction of new planning models, and research on planning process and decision structures
- innovation in planning institutions and municipal and regional governance
- evolution of strategic planning, notably in the metropolitan context
- emerging social issues and priorities, including poverty alleviation, housing policy and programme innovation, the changing role of women in society and in the economy, and issues associated with multicultural societies.

It should be stressed that the above themes are illustrative only. Indeed it is very much hoped that the range of submissions will reflect the broad inter-disciplinary nature of the planning task.

This working paper series has a companion series specialising in urbanisation trends, issues and responses in the Asia-Pacific sphere. The Asian Urban Research Network is edited by Professors Aprodicio Laquian and Michael Leaf. We invite colleagues to submit papers to either of these CHS/SCARP series. (Please see below for address)

As a final note, readers who wish to respond to any of the papers or this series are encouraged to communicate directly with the author(s) concerned. Thank you for your interest in the CHS/SCARP working paper series.

Dr. Thomas A. Hutton
Associate Director, CHS

Editor, CHS/SCARP Working Paper Series
Policy Issues and Planning Responses

Please submit manuscripts to:
Centre for Human Settlements
2206 East Mall
Vancouver, B.C. V6T 1Z3
Canada